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Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law
Gene R. Shreve*
I.

Introduction

Doctrine that sets the preclusive effects of federal judgments reflects
both concern over the appropriate use and conservation of federal judicial resources and the influence of other developments in federal procedure. These factors also are implicated when federal courts are asked to
give preclusive effect to state court judgments. But federal courts have
considerably less capacity to apply federal doctrines to determine the
preclusive effect of state judgments than they do to determine the preclusive results of federal actions because the full faith and credit statute,1
section 1738, requires that state judgments be given as much preclusive
effect in federal court as they would be given by the courts that rendered
them. In many state-judgment cases, section 1738 has long confined federal courts to applying the preclusion law of the rendering state. In other
state-judgment cases, the role of section 1738 has been shrouded in un* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Work leading to the publication of this Article
was funded by a New York Law School faculty research grant. I wish to acknowledge the research
suggestions of Michael Botein and Gil Kujovich and the assistance of Maurice Holland, Michel
Rosenfeld, David Shapiro, Maijorie Silver, and Donald Zeigler, who read and made helpful comments on the manuscript I take sole credit, of course, for any aspect of the Article that might
trouble the reader. I also wish to acknowledge the research assistance of New York Law School
students Thalia Stavirdes and John Brummet. Finally, I wish to thank Marguerite Shreve for her
invaluable editorial help.
1. The statute reads as follows:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States,
or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or
Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the
court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the
said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
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certainty and controversy. My purpose in this Article is to suggest how
the full faith and credit statute should be used to structure choice-of-law
decisions when state judgments are presented in federal court. This Article will address three problems left unresolved in the Supreme Court's2
recent decision, Marrese v. American Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons.
First, it is not always easy or, perhaps, even possible for federal
courts to determine the content of state preclusion law. What if state law
is undeveloped or unclear? What if the nature of the particular preclusion issue is such that no state court will ever rule on it? To what extent
are the obligations of section 1738 relaxed when such difficulties appear?
This Article suggests that section 1738 should be read to require that
federal courts give preclusive effect to state judgments, whether the conclusion of preclusion is supported by apposite state precedents or merely
suggested from a reading of state preclusion law. When state law provides no direction, however, federal courts should be permitted to revert
to federal preclusion law and policy.
Next, when should another congressional act be read to imply an
exception to section 1738? This Article argues that a presumption
against implying an exception to section 1738 should exist in order to
guard against judicial overreaching, reinforce the finality of state judgments, and promote harmony among state and federal courts. This presumption seems capable of withstanding arguments implying an
exception to section 1738 from the creation of concurrentfederal jurisdiction. And, in Marreseand many other cases, the fact that preclusion will
defeat exercise of the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction is also insufficient to overcome this presumption.
Finally, when, if ever, should section 1738 leave federal courts free
to give greater preclusive effect to a state judgment than would the rendering state? This Article contends that although the statute should
place limits on such authority, use of section 1738 categorically to prohibit greater preclusion is neither inevitable nor desirable. Section 1738
should be read to leave federal courts free to apply federal law to augment the preclusive effects of a state judgment whenever doing so would
not frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of lesser preclusion and
would advance the purpose behind the federal rule of greater preclusion.
2. 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
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II. Preclusion in the Federal Courts
A.

Federal Courts as an IntramuralSystem

Federal courts generally regard the preclusive effects of federal judgments to be a question of federal law. 3 Because Congress has provided
very little guidance, 4 federal courts have traditionally elaborated preclusion standards for federal judgments as a matter of common law. 5 The
federal courts' role in this context is equivalent to that played by state
courts in determining the force and effect of their judgments. In either
case, the court is administering an intramural6 law of preclusion for its
own court system. Under the direction of the United States Supreme
Court, the federal courts have extended the reach of their intramural
7
preclusion law in both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
3. It is clear that federal preclusion law governs federal question judgments. Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 n.12 (1971); Heiser v. Woodruff,
327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). There is more question whether the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires reference to state preclusion law to determine the preclusive effect of
federal diversity judgments, but the greater weight of case and critical authority suggests that Erie
has little or no role to play in this context and that federal law should determine the preclusive effect
of all federal judgments. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1166 (5th Cir. 1981); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew,
511 F.2d 710, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Ocean Transp. Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1189
(3d Cir. 1970); Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 696
(1985); Degnan, FederalizedRes Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 769-70 (1976). But see Gasbarra v.
Park-Ohio Indus., 655 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (referring to state law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment); Burbank, InterurisdictionalPreclusionand FederalCommon Law: Toward a GeneralApproach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 631, 637-38 (1985) (questioning
the invariable application of federal law to determine the effect of federal diversity judgments); Note,
Res Judicatain the FederalCourts: FederalorState Law?, 17 IND. L. REV. 523 (1984) (arguing that
the Erie doctrine should be understood to require measurement of the preclusive effect of diversity
judgments according to state law).
The majority view has been developed most fully in Professor Degnan's article and seems to be
the preferable approach. The subject, however, lies beyond the scope of this Article, which discusses
state judgments. The preclusive effect of federal judgments in state court also lies beyond the scope
of this Article. For a valuable discussion of that subject, see Shapiro, State Courts and Federal
DeclaratoryJudgments, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 759 (1979).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982), which provides for the registration of federal judgments in other
federal districts, states that "[a] judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of
the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner." Section 1963
fails, however, to provide any standards for determining the scope of federal preclusion. Furthermore, Professor Hazard identifies "only one federal statute that expressly deals with resjudicata,the
well-known provision concerning issue preclusion of the Clayton Act." Hazard, Reflections on the
Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 643 (1985).
5. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4403, at 11 (1981).
6. See Casad,Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS at 2 (1982); Casad,
Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510,
511 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion].
7. The United States Supreme Court has employed this terminology in several of its recent
cases. E.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). The term
"claim preclusion" has become the modern synonym for the combined terms "merger" and "bar."
"Issue preclusion" has similarly succeeded "collateral estoppel" and "estoppel by judgment." The
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The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties to final judgments
from relitigating claims and may also foreclose the litigation of new
claims. A new claim is precluded when it is so closely related to a previously raised claim that together they constitute a "claim"8 in a larger
sense. This expanded concept of a claim is intended to signify all of the
alternative legal theories and the full scope of remedies generated by the
facts of the original controversy. 9 Whether the entire claim, in this broad
sense, was actually put forward in the prior case is immaterial; what matters is whether it could have been put forward. 10
.Like their state counterparts, federal courts have faced problems in
determining the limits of the doctrine of claim preclusion. Disappointed
parties clearly need to be prevented from relitigating the same claims, but
it is more difficult to decide when matters not actually raised in the prior
proceeding should also be precluded. The Supreme Court once adhered
to a formalistic and relatively narrow conception of a claim for preclusion purposes.1 1 In more recent times, however, many lower federal
courts have adopted the expansive definition of a claim contained in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments,12 and the Supreme Court has indischolarship of the late Professor Alan Vestal is primarily responsible for causing this change. Eg.,
A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PREcLUSION (1969); Vestal, Rationaleof Preclusion,9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
29, 30 (1964); see also Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have PreclusiveEffect?, 70 IowA L. REv. 27,
27 n.2 (1984) (discussing the adoption of Vestal's preclusion terminology by the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments). Some of my sources employ the earlier terminology. Eg., infra note 9. Ordinarily, I will not note the difference in terminology. To simplify matters, I will use the terms claim and
issue preclusion throughout the Article.
8. The phrase, "cause of action," is also used. E.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110,
130 (1983).
9. See Vestal, Res Judicata/ClaimPreclusion: Judgmentfor the Claimant,62 Nw. U.L. REv.
357, 359-61 (1967). For a lucid description of this phenomenon before it was called claim preclusion, see Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 343-44 (1948).
10. "A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)
(holding that parties are also bound as to matters that could have been raised); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877) (same); cf Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) ("Claim preclusion refers to the effect ofajudgment in foreclosing litigation of
a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it should have been advanced
in an earlier suit.").
11. See, e.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) (describing a cause of
action as "the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong"); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 5, § 4407, at 59 (describing Baltimore as limiting the idea of a claim "to violation of a single right by a single wrong").
12. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). Section 24 employs a transactional approach. Subsection (1) states that the former judgment precludes "all rights of the plaintiff
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the [original] action arose." Subsection (2) provides that the
scope of "transaction" and "series" of transactions "are to be determined pragmatically, giving
weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." See generally 18 C. WRIGHT,A. MILLER
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cated that it may do the same. 13
The doctrine of issue preclusion supplements claim preclusion by
giving a final adjudication preclusive effect in a subsequent case that cannot be said, even in the broadest sense, to share the same claim. The
doctrine precludes relitigation of issues of fact or law so long as the issue
was actually raised, litigated, and necessary to the judgment in the prior
14
proceeding.
One question has dominated modem-day developments in issue preclusion in both the federal and state intramural systems: When, if ever,
can nonparties to the prior adjudication employ the doctrine? At one
time the federal rule was never. Under the Supreme Court's mutuality
doctrine, it was impossible for those who could not have been bound by a
prior adjudication to use it to their advantage. 15 Later, the Supreme
Court attached importance to the difference between binding total strangers 16 to the prior litigation and binding those who had previously obtained an adjudication of the issue, albeit against a different party.' 7 The
& E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4407, at 62 n.35 (surveying federal cases adopting § 24 and noting
other federal decisions that have employed alternatives to the transactional approach of § 24 to
broaden the scope of claim preclusion).
13. The Supreme Court briefly discussed § 24 in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983),
observing that "[d]efimitions of what constitutes the same cause of action have not remained static
over time." Id at 130. The Court followed this observation by comparing the claim definitions in
the first and second Restatement of Judgments. Id The Court praised § 24 as "a more pragmatic
approach." Id. at 131 n.12. The Court declined to go further and "parse any minute differences
which these differing tests might produce" because it concluded that the plaintiffs were, under either
test, subject to claim preclusion. Idt at 131.
14. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 618-19 (3d ed. 1985); cf Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) ("Issue preclusion refers to the effect of a
judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided."); A. VESTAL,
supra note 7, at 196-206.
These prerequisites have no counterpart in claim preclusion. The latter may be based on any
judgment on the merits, including (subject to limited possibilities of collateral attack-see infra note
63) default judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 comment a (1982); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 655.
15. Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918);
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
16. It remains true that genuine strangers to the prior proceeding cannot be bound by it. "It is
a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy
and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 327 n.7 (1979). In a few federal cases, strangers to a prior adjudication in the technical sense
that they were not parties have been subjected to issue preclusion because of the extent of their actual
involvement. See, ag., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979) (holding that even
though it was not a named party, the United States "plainly had a sufficient 'laboring-oar' in the
conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of [collateral] estoppel"). For arguments
that issue preclusion should be used more extensively against nonparties, see Berch, A Proposalto
PermitCollateralEstoppel ofNonpartiesSeeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 511. But see
Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of CollateralEstoppel Against Nonparties to
PriorLitigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383 (1983) (discussing possible violations of due process when the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is used against a nonparty in the prior litigation).
17. The Court criticized the mutuality doctrine for "failing to recognize the obvious difference
in position between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and lost."
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Court has now dispensed with the doctrine of mutuality' 8 and permits
strangers to the prior litigation to employ issue preclusion against those
who were parties, 19 whenever it appears from the circumstances that it is
20
fair to do So.
Maximum use of claim and issue preclusion makes particular sense
in the federal intramural system for two reasons. First, preclusion doc21
trines promote conservation of severely-taxed federal judicial resources.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979); see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-27 (1971) (discussing the decline of the mutuality
requirement).
For an excellent discussion of Parklane,see Holland, ModernizingRes Judicata"Reflections on
the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.L 615 (1980).
18. Although the Supreme Court refused to invoke the mutuality requirement in BlonderTongue, the implications of the decision beyond its patent-law context were unclear. But, in Parklane, "the Court conclusively ended the mutuality of estoppel requirement in the federal courts and
authorized the use of nonmutual estoppel." Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 968 (1984). For
a survey of lower federal court decisions follwing Parklane,see Corr, Supreme CourtDoctrine in the
Trenches: The Case of CollateralEstoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35, 55-65 (1985).
19. Strangers to the prior adjudication may employ issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel) defensively or offensively. The Court recently used the terms to connote whether the party
seeking the benefit of preclusion does so from the posture of a plaintiff (offensive use) or defendant
(defensive use). United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n.4 (1984); see also 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4464, at 576 n.13 (surveying numerous federal decisions
permitting defensive nonmutual issue preclusion); id. at 577-78 n.14 (surveying numerous federal
decisions permitting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion). It now appears that issue preclusion
may be invoked defensively against the United States as a party, United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co.,
464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984), but not offensively, Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162. Stauffer and Mendoza are
discussed in Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 70 IOwA L.
REV.113 (1984). For further discussion of Mendoza, see Note, CollateralEstoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuitof Litigant Equity, 99 HARv. L. REv. 847
(1986).
20. Parklane can best be understood as completing the process, begun in Blonder-Tongue, of
replacing one fairness test with another. The mutuality doctrine was bottomed on the idea that it
was unfair to create risk-free opportunities for preclusion and that benefits of the preclusion were
spoils of victory earned through the risk of equally adverse consequences. Rejecting this idea, Parklane declared that henceforth it would be necessary to come up with some good reason why nonmutual offensive preclusion should not be permitted. The Court granted federal courts "broad
discretion to determine when it should be applied." Parklane,439 U.S. at 331. Federal courts may
use their discretion to refuse offensive preclusion when it is sought by one who deliberately bypassed
an opportunity to participate in the original proceeding, when the defendant's stake in the original
proceeding was so small that he had no incentive to defend vigorously, when the previous judgment
relied on for preclusion was inconsistent with other judgments, or when the subsequent proceeding
afforded significantly more advantageous procedural opportunities for the defendant. Id. at 330-31.
These considerations, among others, provide a pragmatic and loose-textured fairness test. This new
test shifts the focus of attention from the party wishing to use the doctrine to the party against whom
it is invoked.
21. Docket overcrowding has been a serious problem for some time, particularly in the federal
circuit courts. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 55-56, 1572-74 (2d ed. 1973); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 31-33 (1973). See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets
and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function ofReview and the NationalLaw, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 542 (1969) (discussing the heavy caseloads in the federal appellate courts); Meador, Appellate
Case Management and DecisionalProcesses, 61 VA. L. REV. 255 (1975) (same); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in JudicialAdministration, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 959 (1964) (same).
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Although some commentators have questioned the relationship between
preclusion and judicial economy, 22 it seems clear that growing aversion
to relitigation is a leading reason for the expansion of preclusion doc24
trines in general 23 and in the federal intramural system in particular.
25
26
Second, the liberal claim and party joinder available in federal court
is intended to dispose of as many controversies as possible in the first
instance. By penalizing piecemeal litigation and delay, broadened preclusion pressures litigants to avail themselves of the many opportunities
27
that the initial lawsuit provides.

B.

Intersystem Preclusion

When federal courts consider the effect of state judgments, the
courts are part of an intersystem 2s judicial process. So long as state and
federal preclusion law is identical, intersystem cases pose no special difficulties. This is frequently true, because the expansion of the preclusive
effects of federal judgments has its counterpart in the law of most
states. 29 The question whether to rely on state or federal law in such
22. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 14 ("It is difficult to
find much independent support for res judicata rules simply as a means to protect overworked
courts."); Cleary, supra note 9, at 348-49 (rejecting "the saving in court time" as a "particularly
unconvincing" justification for what would now be called claim preclusion).
23. Vestal, supra note 7, at 35; cf Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 611
(1985) ("Resource conservation is a familiar and persistent motif in the literature of courts. Of late,
as courts appear overused and underproductive, interest in economy has increased.").
24. The Supreme Court said in Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), that
it found one of its fifty-year-old res judicata precedents "even more compelling in view of today's
crowded dockets." Id. at 401.
25. For example, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "now makes it clear that any
party who has asserted a claim for relief against an opposing party or parties may join with it
whatever other claims he may have, regardless of their nature, against any opposing party." C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 526 (4th ed. 1983).
26. For example, the limits of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules are sufficiently broad that
all those injured by a single tort may join as plaintiffs .... The rule does not require that
all questions presented by each plaintiff be common; it is enough if there is any... question common to all the claims. Similarly, all distinctions between joint and several rights
or obligations on a contract have been abolished.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 14, at 476 (emphasis in original).
27. Federal litigants also enjoy liberal discovery and relatively broad opportunities for pleading
amendment. It has been noted that, along with liberal claim pleading, "[t]hese opportunities thus
enlarge the scope of what 'might have been' litigated by the plaintiff in the first action and should
correspondingly enlarge the scope of claim preclusion." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 14, at
617.
28. The term is from Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion,supra note 6, at 511.
29. Propreclusion developments in federal court are part of a larger movement. "[T]he trend in
the United States is toward increased finality." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF
LAws: COMMENTS-CASES-QUESTIONS 657 (3d ed. 1981). The approaches taken by the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments in its broad, transactional definition of a claim (§ 24) and in its rejection
of the mutuality doctrine (§ 29) generally reflect the positions of most state intramural systems. The
nearness of the emerging federal test to the Restatement's claim definition has already been noted.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's nonmutual preclusion test in
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cases is largely a matter of protocol.30
But different court systems have not set the same boundaries for
their preclusion doctrines; the federal and various state systems have
adopted different approaches. 3' This is not because of disagreement over
what preclusion policies courts should recognize. The same general policies 32 are accepted everywhere. 33 Furthermore, concern for correctness
of judicial decision, the prudential counterforce to preclusion, 34 is also a
constant in all systems. Differences result because of other policies in
each system that the preclusion law must support (for example, the federal policies of liberal claim and party joinder, pleading amendments,
and discovery) 35 and because of varying local assessments of the scarcity
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979), is quite similar to the criteria appearing
in § 29 of the Restatement. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE &A. MILLER, supranote 3, at 692 n.36
(suggesting that the American Law Institute adopted the Parklane criteria in § 29).
30. For example, in Brown v. St. Louis Police Dep't, 691 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1982), although the
Eighth Circuit looked to Missouri law to determine the claim preclusive effect of a Missouri state
judgment, the court noted that it would have come to the same conclusion had it instead relied on
federal preclusion doctrine. Id. at 396 n.2.
31. The clash of viewpoints may be largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. "Courts and
judges of the 19th century shared a common understanding of res judicata in terms of what a judgment decided. ... [This common agreement no longer exists .
Degnan, supra note 3, at 742
(emphasis in original).
32. Briefly stated, the policies are "to save judicial energy, to prevent harassment of the defendant, to further societal interests in the orderly and expeditious resolution of controversies, and to give
repose ....
A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 1459 (1965). For further discussion, see A. VESTAL,

supra note 7, at 7-12; Vestal, supra note 7, at 31-43. On the particular significance of giving repose to
judicial decisions, see infra note 104.
33. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 14, at 590 (stating that the "social objectives of the
rules [of res judicata] have remained much the same").
34. Strangers to the prior proceeding are usually able to resist its preclusive effects on due
process grounds. See supra note 16. This is less because the judgment might be incorrect than
because due process, in this context, guarantees a "day in court." Because those who participated in
the prior proceeding have had a day in court, they usually will be unable to use due process as a
shield against preclusion. See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text. When participants' resistance to preclusion succeeds, it is because of concern over the correctness of the prior adjudication.
It is often said that the incorrectness of a judgment does not diminish its preclusive effect. See,
e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 (1981) (stating that the "res judicata
consequences of a final, unappealed judgment [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may
have been wrong"). This is certainly true when the second suit is a replication of the first, but the
more dissimilar the suits become, the more the point loses force. Every system seems to recognize
some point at which preclusion (although constitutional) is inappropriate because the judgment does
not carry a sufficient assurance of correctness to properly govern the different case. As Learned
Hand observed, res judicata "must be treated as a compromise between two conflicting interests: the
convenience of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and the adequacy of the remedies afforded for conceded wrongs." Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955); see also
Vestal, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing Lyons).
The functions that concerns about correctness play in checking constitutional applications of
preclusion may explain why preclusion law-unlike the law of personal jurisdiction-has, for the
most part, not become a subcategory of the constitutional law of due process.
35. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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of judicial resources. 36 Within constitutional limits, each intramural approach determines how many opportunities to litigate should be sacrificed for the good of its system.
Two important issues illustrate conflicting approaches: claim definition and recognition of nonmutual issue preclusion. Most state systems
give "claim" a broad definition, similar to that found in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments and the federal intramural system. 37 A minority
of states, however, adhere to a narrower definition. They permit accident plaintiffs to split what appears to be a single claim into separate
suits for property damage and personal injury. 38 Similarly, although
most state systems have joined the Restatement (Second) and the federal
courts in permitting some degree of nonmutual issue preclusion, 39 a minority still adhere to the mutuality doctrine. 40
There are other, not yet as significant, points of existing or potential
conflict in preclusion law. For example, when should judgment in the
original proceeding be considered final, 4 1 and what effect, if any, should
be given punitive dismissals? 42 Claim preclusion is subject to real and
potential differences over the scope of privity 43 and over the effect of rule
36. Cf.supra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text (discussing the view that federal judicial
resources are overtaxed).

37. See supra notes 12-13, 30 and accompanying text.
38. Discussions of claim splitting in accident cases may be found in J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 695; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 557-58 (1965); Annot., 62
A.L.R.2D 977 (1958). The most recent case survey lists California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Virginia as jurisdictions that permit separate accident suits for personal injury and property damage. Annot., 24 A.L.R.4TH 646, 685-86 (1983). At
least two states in this group appear to be wavering. See Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 564,
213 A.2d 26, 28 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (stating that absent exceptional circumstances
there is only one cause of action); McNichols v. Weiss, 12 A.D.2d 646, 646, 208 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722
(1960) (refusing to allow plaintiff to split personal injury, property damage, and loss of services
claims resulting from a single accident).
39. See supra notes 18-20, 30.
40. See cases cited at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note (1982);
Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 510 n.1, 518 n.35; Annot., 31 A.L.R.3D 1044,
1062-64 (1970). Professor Casad writes that "in recent years, nine states have reaffirmed their adherence to the mutuality doctrine." Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion,supra note 6, at 510 n.1
(citing cases from Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Lousiana, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota).
41. "[It has become clear in the federal courts that res judicata ordinarily attaches to a final
lower court judgment even though an appeal has been taken and remains undecided." 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4427, at 270. In contrast, some state systems do
not give finality to their judgments if there is a possibility that the outcome will be changed through
appeal. See, e.g., Chavez v. Morris, 566 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D. Utah 1983) ("A Utah state court
judgment is not final while an appeal is pending or until the time to appeal has expired.").
42. "Penalty dismissals seem exquisitely difficult." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 5, § 4467, at 643.
43. "Res judicata principles differ from state to state" concerning "the definition of persons in
privity with a party .. " R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 29, at 746.
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12(b)(6)-type dismissals. 44 Differences in issue preclusion law include
the scope of the "necessarily decided" prerequisite, 45 extension of the
doctrine to ultimate as well as to evidentiary facts, 4 6 and the effects, if
any, of default judgments. 47
Choice-of-law issues arise when a state judgment presented for enforcement in federal court comes from a system with a conflicting intramural preclusion rule. To the extent that federal policies are at stake
when federal courts are called upon to enforce state judgments, it might
be reasonable to expect federal courts to apply their own preclusion doctrine in intersystem cases. The Supreme Court, however, has read the
full faith and credit statute 8 to greatly restrict the authority of a federal
court to vary from the preclusion law of the rendering state.
Section 1738's requirement, that federal courts give "such faith and
credit" to state "records and judicial proceedings" as they would have in
the courts of that state, dates from the Act's passage in 1790.49 Although
there is scant history concerning the enactment of what is now section
44. Under the federal intramural standard, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are decisions on the merits,
and thus are capable of generating claim preclusion. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 399 n.3 (1981). The federal rule appears to be the same as that of many state courts-claim
preclusion operates even when dismissal is brought about by curable defects in the pleading. 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4439, at 354 (stating that "most federal and
state courts hold that the second action [brought on an improved complaint] is precluded"). But
some state systems continue to follow what was once the majority rule and refuse to extend claim
preclusion this far. See, eg., Gilbert v. Braniff Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting
that an involuntary dismissal that allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complaint was not preclusive
under Illinois state law).
45. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 642.
46. See id; Lewis, Mutuality in Conflict-Flexibilityand Full Faith and Credit, 23 DRAKE L.
REV. 364, 369-70 (1974) (discussing Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959) and explaining that the New York court applied collateral estoppel to evidentiary facts, although New Hampshire did not permit such application).
47. The federal court position appears to be that default judgments are incapable of generating
issue preclusion. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (stating that "judgment in the prior suit precludes litigation of issues actually litigatedand necessary to the outcome of
the first action") (emphasis added); see also 18 C. WRIGHT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5,
§ 4442, at 375-76 n.3 (stating that default judgments do not support issue preclusion when judgments are entered without further inquiry upon failure to answer).
New York's intramural system takes the opposite view-default judgments can support issue
preclusion with reference to issues that might have been raised if the lawsuit had proceeded. D.
SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK PRACTICE 597 (1978); Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New
York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 174 (1969) (stating that New York decisions indicate "that defaults ... foreclose matters that might have been raised and decided").
New York's position may be so unfair that it is unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying
notes 267-69. But if the New York rule is valid, the situation presents an example-perhaps the only
one-of the federal intramural system opting for the less preclusive of two permissible options.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The text of the statute appears supra note 1.
49. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. For the text of the original statute, see
Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 60 (1957).
Documents explaining the legislative history of the Act apparently were destroyed when the British
burned the Capitol in 1814. See id. at 60 n.124. Amendments to the statute, reviewed in
Nadelmann, id. at 8 1-86 and Brilmayer, CreditDue Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respec-
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1738,50 it seems clear that Congress intended to impose upon federal
courts an obligation to recognize and enforce the judgments of states
equivalent to the obligation imposed on sister states by the Constitution's
full faith and credit clause5 1 to recognize and enforce sister-state judg53
ments. 52 The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute accordingly.
Congress has the authority to elaborate a more precise and system54
atic set of regulations for the intersystem enforcement of judgments.
Commentators have raised the idea,55 but Congress has never really acted upon it; and, except in child custody cases, 5 6 section 1738 has remained the standard for regulating choice of preclusion law.
Several of the earliest federal cases considered article IV and section
1738 to do no more than repeat the requirement of the full faith and
credit clause of the Articles of Confederation: 57 that judgments be taken
tive Roles ofDue ProcessandFullFaith and Credit in the InterstateContext, 70 IowA L. REV. 95, 95
n.2 (1984), have not altered the standard set forth in the text.
50. See Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full
Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 66 (1982); Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A
Reappraisal,63 N.C.L. REV. 59, 84 (1984). Documents making up the legislative history of the Act
have been lost. Nadelmann, supra note 49, at 60 n.124.
51. U.S, CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."
52. Atwood, supra note 50, at 67; Degnan, supra note 3, at 743-44.
53. Eg., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1939) ("The Act extended the rule of the Constitution
to all courts, federal as well as state.").
Numerous articles have been written covering all or part of the history ofjudgment recognition
from colonial times, through the Articles of Confederation, to the constitutional period. See
Nadelmann, supra note 49; Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-InterpretiveReexamination of the Full Faith and Due Process Clauses (PartOne), 14
CREIGHTON L. REv. 499 (1981); see also Degnan, supra note 3, at 742 n.5 (listing numerous authorities that discuss the evolution of the constitutional concept of full faith and credit); Radin, The
Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1944) (providing a
detailed analysis of the historical developments of the full faith and credit clause); Reese & Johnson,
The Scope of FullFaith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 153 n.4 (1949) (listing
authorities that discuss the history of the clause); Sumner, FullFaith and Creditfor JudicialProceedings, 2 UCLA L. REV. 441 (1955) (analyzing the advocacy of and defenses to a full faith and credit
claim in judicial proceedings).
54. In addition to the authority ceded to Congress in art. IV, § I of the Constitution, other
bases of legislative jurisdiction include the commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, and the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Insofar as federal judgments or federal enforcement by courts are involved, Congress' authority under article III is also implicated.
55. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 195 (1982); E.
SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 219 (2d ed. 1972);
Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89.
56. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), augments
§ 1738 by giving full faith and credit to state child custody decrees. For a discussion of the Act, see
Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV.
711 (1982).
57. The final paragraph of art. IV of the Articles of Confederation stated: "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts
and magistrates of every other State."
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as prima facie evidence in subsequent proceedings. 58 Such an approach
would have left federal courts free to apply their own law in determining
the preclusive effects of state judgments. It was not long, however,
before the Supreme Court rejected this view. In Mills v. Duryee,59 the
Court held that for a federal court to give full faith and credit to a New
York state judgment it must identify and apply New York preclusion
law. 60 Justice Story wrote: "[W]e can perceive no rational interpretation
of the act... unless it declares a judgment conclusive when a court of the
particular state where it is rendered would pronounce the same decision." 6 1 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
statute in judgment-enforcement settings served as a choice-of-preclu62
sion-law directive.
Today, federal courts will apply state preclusion law in most statejudgment cases. But two exceptions to this requirement exist and two
more should be seriously entertained.
The first two exceptions are clearly established. Section 1738 does
not require federal courts to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment when it would be unconstitutional to do so, or when another congressional enactment operates to suspend section 1738. Two further
exceptions should exist. Federal courts should not be confined to state
preclusion law when it is so undeveloped or confused that it does not
suggest an answer. In addition, federal courts should be free to give
greater effect to a state judgment than the rendering court would give,
when doing so would not frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of
lesser preclusion and would advance the purpose behind the federal forum's rule of greater preclusion.
The first of these four exceptions acknowledges the obligation of
federal courts to consider properly raised due process objections to insufficient notice or the lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend58. For a review of cases so holding during the Articles of Confederation period, see Sumner,
supra note 53, at 442 n.6. For early cases taking the same view under article IV of the Constitution
and the full faith and credit statute, see Nadelmann, supra note 49, at 63-64; Sumner, supra note 53,
at 443.
59. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
60. "[I]t
is beyond all doubt that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York was conclusive upon the parties in that state. It must, therefore, be conclusive here also." Id. at 484.
61. Id. at 485.
62. See, eg., Union & Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903) (stating that "[a]s the
judgment pleaded had no force or effect in the Tennessee state courts other than as a bar to the
identical taxes litigated in the suit, the courts of the United States can afford it no greater efficacy");
Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818) (reaffirming the Mills doctrine that a state
court judgment has the same effect in federal courts as it does in other state courts); see also infra
note 103 (citing other cases that apply the Mills doctrine); cf Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 135 (1912) ("The general effect of a judgment of a court of
one State... is that which it has, by law or usage, in the courts of the State from which it comes.").
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ants 63 in the prior state proceeding. Similarly, federal courts must
consider whether the preclusion rule of the judgment-rendering state is
so sweeping that it lacks the fundamental fairness that due process requires. 64 Because the state court that rendered the judgment would be
required to entertain these same due process issues, a federal court may
65
do so without denying the judgments full faith and credit.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment c (1982); cf. Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) (stating that § 1738 does not alter the inability of federal
courts to "give preclusive effect... to a constitutionally infirm judgment").
Adequacy of notice and personal jurisdiction questions underlying the judgment may be raised
if the judgment was obtained by default. This rule of general application was noted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 (1982), and by the Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706-07 (1982).
Because a frequent consequence of insufficient notice is that the defendant learns of the original
adjudication only after it has been reduced to a final judgment, collateral attack on notice grounds is
freely available. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 comment b (1982). In contrast, the
defendant is in a position to appreciate the personal jurisdiction issue as soon as he receives the
summons and complaint. As a result, the defendant has the option of litigating in the forum selected
by plaintiff or taking a default judgment and collaterally attacking it on jurisdictional grounds when
it is presented for enforcement elsewhere (typically the defendant's home state).
It is essential that a defendant be permitted the option of taking a default judgment and collaterally attacking it on jurisdictional grounds. Whatever the claim-preclusive effect of a default judgment generally, see supra note 14, due process requires that a defendant's refusal to participate in the
forum the plaintiff selected should not preclude him from subsequently attacking the judgment on
personal jurisdiction grounds. On the one hand, under these circumstances, the "right to challenge
jurisdiction makes [the defendant] an instrument for confining judicial authority to its prescribed
limits." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 comment b (1982). On the other hand, if

the defendant elects initially to challenge personal jurisdiction and is unsuccessful, that decision will
preclude reexamination of the question when the judgment is presented for enforcement. Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703-05; Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Theoretically,
preclusion law also should prevent collateral attack if the defendant omitted his jurisdictional challenge when participating in the initial proceeding. The tendency in such cases, however, is for courts
to reach the same result simply by noting that defendant's participation in the initial proceeding
operated as a consent to jurisdiction. E.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703-05.
64. Due process usually protects strangers to the prior proceeding from preclusion. See supra
note 16. Due process may also protect prior participants from unfair surprise. Atwood, supra note
50, at 70; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion,supra note 6, at 524.
65. See Jackson, FullFaith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1945);
Reese & Johnson, supra note 53, at 165. The Supreme Court has observed that, in refusing enforcement to a state judgment on due process grounds, "other state and federal courts would still be
providing a state court judgment with the 'same' preclusive effect as the courts of the State from
which the judgment emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982).
Due process developments are in a state of flux concerning the limits to be imposed on courts'
personal jurisdiction. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme
Court held that the due process clause allowed jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who could
not be found and served in the forum state if, under the circumstances, the exercise of jurisdiction
would be "reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice. . . ." Id. at 320. The Court continues to struggle in an attempt to make this rather inchoate standard intelligible. The past two terms produced five decisions: Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). For a useful review of recent developments, see Hay,
Refining PersonalJurisdiction in the United States, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 32 (1986).
Sister-state and federal courts are also under no obligation to enforce judgments that, for any
other reason, would be denied enforcement by the state courts originally rendering them. See A.
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The authority of federal courts to refuse enforcement of state judgments on due process grounds is beyond question. Important questions
exist, however, concerning the prerequisites for the second exception and
when or whether the third and fourth exceptions should apply. In addressing these questions, this Article begins with a recent case that
presented the Supreme Court an opportunity to answer them: Marrese v.
66
American Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons.
III.
A.

The Supreme Court at the Crossroads: The Marrese Case
The Decisions

The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons denied membership to Dr. Marrese and a copetitioner. They sued the Academy in Illinois state court, alleging breach of a duty (founded upon the Illinois
Constitution and Illinois common law) to consider fairly their applications. The court dismissed their case for failure to state a claim. The
plaintiffs then filed a federal antitrust suit in Illinois. The Academy
moved to dismiss on the ground that the final judgments in the prior
Illinois state case precluded the federal antitrust claims. After several
district and circuit decisions, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, de67
cided that the claims were precluded.
Writing for a plurality of the court, Judge Posner acknowledged
that plaintiffs' antitrust claims 68 could not have been presented in the
prior state proceeding because they were within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal court. 69 But, he noted, plaintiffs could have presented similar Illinois state antitrust claims in the prior suit. 70 Judge Posner suggested that if plaintiffs had initially joined state antitrust claims with the
claims actually raised in the prior case, and if the state antitrust claims
had been finally adjudicated, that would have precluded a subsequent
federal adjudication of the federal antitrust claims. 71 He contended that
VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 32, at 1596; see also Averill, Choice-of-Law Problems
Raised by Sister-State Judgments and the Full-Faith-and-CreditMandate, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 686,
688 (1969) (discussing the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964); cf
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1962) (concluding that South Carolina courts were not required
to give preclusive effect to a Virginia judgment because Virginia courts probably would not accord
claim preclusion to dismissal of a child custody case).
66. 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
67. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
68. Plaintiffs brought suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 726 F.2d at
1151. Their claims for damages and injunctive relief brought the case within the federal court's
exclusive jurisdiction under § 15 and § 26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982).
69. 726 F.2d at 1154.
70. Id. at 1153, 1155.
71. Id. at 1153-54.
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the result should not be different just because the state antitrust claims
72
were not raised in the prior case.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, reversed
the Seventh Circuit. 73 The Court stated that section 1738 requires a federal court considering the preclusive effect of a state judgment to begin
its inquiry by examining state preclusion law. 74 The circuit court erred
in disregarding Illinois state law.7 5 Noting disagreement in the circuit
opinions and between the parties over whether the prior judgment would
be given claim preclusive effect under Illinois law, the Court remanded
the case so that the district court might initially determine the content of
76
Illinois preclusion law.

B.

The Statutory Exception Question

The Constitution probably does not compel federal courts to recog77
nize the preclusive effects of state judgments created under state law. It
72. IdL at 1154-56. In his lengthy dissent, Judge Cudahy set forth the opposing view. Id. at
1173-83. He argued that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to
accept limitations that state preclusion law places on state judgments. Because he read Illinois decisions to follow the general principle that a court's judgments do not preclude claims that the court is
not competent to adjudicate, and because Illinois state courts were not competent to adjudicate
plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims, Judge Cudahy concluded that the prior adjudication was not
preclusive under Illinois law. Id. at 1180. He further argued that, even if federal courts were free to
give greater force to a state judgment, Marrese did not present the appropriate occasion for doing so
for several reasons. Judge Cudahy saw material differences between the state and federal antitrust
causes of action. As a more basic matter, he questioned the plurality's comparison of the Illinois and
federal antitrust claims when the state antitrust claim had not been presented in the prior proceeding. Judge Cudahy was particularly concerned that the plurality's approach could lead to trial in
absentia of federal antitrust claims in state proceedings. This, he felt, would undermine the goal of
uniform interpretation and application of federal antitrust law intended by exclusive federal jurisdiction. For an extensive critique of the opinions of Judges Posner and Cudahy, see Comment, The
Claim PreclusiveEffect of State Judgments ofFederalAntitrustClaims: Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 71 IowA L. REv. 609 (1986).
Retired Justice Stewart (sitting on the Seventh Circuit by designation) voiced many of these
criticisms in his dissent to an earlier Marrese decision that was subsequently vacated en banc. See
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1096-1100 (7th Cir. 1982).
For a description of the complex subsequent history and vacation of this case, see 726 F.2d at 1152.
73. 470 U.S. 373 (1985). The Justices voted 7-0 in favor of reversal with Justices Blackmun and
Stevens not participating in the decision. Chief Justice Burger filed a separate opinion.
74. The point is made at least three times in the Court's opinion, see id. at 375, 380-81, 386, and
also in the Chief Justice's concurrence, see id. at 387.
75. Id. at 375.
76. Id. at 387.
77. Article IV of the Constitution imposes a full faith and credit obligation only upon sister
states. See supra note 51. Perhaps it could be argued that, in the absence of the full faith and credit
statute, the tenth amendment would place some obligation on federal courts to respect state judgments. Even during the halcyon period of tenth amendment law, however, when National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was in force, the argument would not have been easy to make.
And the climate for the argument worsened considerably when the Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled NationalLeagueof Cities. For a discussion of Garcia, see Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985).
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follows that Congress did not have to enact the original full faith and
credit statute, and that it is free either to repeal it or to lighten its obligations by amending it to create exceptions. As the law now stands, however, section 1738 contains no exceptions. 78 One must look for
exceptions in other federal statutes. For example, Congress has expressly
suspended the full faith and credit requirement in the federal habeas
corpus statute. 79 But the question will more often be whether suspension, though not expressly required, is necessary to effectuate the purposes for a statutory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In short,
should a court imply an exception to the mandate of section 1738?
Because Congress has not expressly suspended the preclusive effect
of state judgments in subsequent federal antitrust cases,80 Marrese provided the Supreme Court with precisely the kind of implied-exception
issue that has divided commentators 81 and generated uncertainty in the
lower federal courts.8 2 But the Court declined to resolve the issue, stat78. For the text of the statute, see supra note 1. It is clear that the "full faith and credit"
obligation of the statute requires at the very least that federal courts give as much preclusive effect to
state judgments as would the courts that rendered them. See infra note 103.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982); see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra
note 21, at 245 (Supp. 1981); Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317,
330, 333 (1978).
80. The exclusive character of federal antitrust jurisdiction has itself arisen through judicial
interpretation instead of express statutory language. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.
Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252
U.S. 436, 440-41 (1920).
For examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction clearly expressed by statute, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (patent and copyright actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) (actions to quiet title to real estate to
which the United States claims an interest). The American Law Institute recommended that exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction also be expressed by statute. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 24-25 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI
STUDY].

81. CompareVestal, supra note 9, at 374-75 (arguing for preclusion when plaintiff has choice of
forum) andNote, The CollateralEstoppelEffect ofPriorState CourtFindingsin Cases Within Exclusive FederalJurisdiction, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1290-91 (1978) (arguing for preclusion because of
federal power of pendent jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Note, Estoppel-Exclusive Jurisdiction]
and Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect of PriorState-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REv. 1360, 1385 (1967) (arguing for preclusion when plaintiff initially elects to
file in a court of limited jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction-StateCourt]
with Atwood, supra note 50, at 63 (arguing against preclusion because of exclusive jurisdiction) and
Burbank, Aftervords: A Response to ProfessorHazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L
REv. 659, 664 (1985) (arguing that in exclusive jurisdiction cases, federal courts should be able to
adopt their own preclusion rules) and Comment, CollateralEstoppelEffect ofState CourtJudgments
in FederalAntitrust Suits, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 955, 965 (1963) (stating that the inadequacies in the
procedures of the first court should overcome any need for strict preclusion) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, State Judgments-FederalAntitrust] and Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1957) (arguing against preclusion
because of the insulating effect of exclusive federal jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusive
Jurisdiction-PrivateActions]. The American Law Institute has come out clearly against preclusion
in this context. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e, § 26 comment c,
illustration 2 (1982).
82. Atwood, supra note 50, at 62; see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5,

1224

Preclusion and Choice of Law
ing that such a determination would be necessary only if the inquiry into
state law on remand led to the conclusion that the prior judgment was
83
preclusive under Illinois law.
Marrese did work one change in the law. Federal courts will no
longer be able to ignore section 1738 when considering the implications
of exclusive federal jurisdiction on the enforceability of state judgments. 84 It is unfortunate, however, that the Court's opinion does not
shed more light on how federal courts should frame and resolve implied
85
statutory-exception issues.
The Court did offer the following general observation concerning
the approach that should be taken on remand:
[Resolving] whether the concerns underlying a particular grant of
exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal
of § 1738 ... will depend on the particular federal statute as well
as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action. Our previous decisions indicate
that the primary con86
sideration must be the intent of Congress.
The opinion, however, provides little specific guidance beybnd a review of the sketchy picture that the Court's earlier decisions created. As
it had already suggested in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,87 the
Court rejected the idea that exclusive federal jurisdiction invariably creates an exception to section 1738.88 At the same time, the Court seemed,
through its use of Brown v. Felsen,8 9 to confirm that implied statutory
exceptions to section 1738, at least theoretically, are possible. 90
§ 4470. Compare RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social Servs., 684 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1982) (exclusive jurisdiction exercised notwithstanding a state judgment) and Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo
Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982) with Derish v. San
Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1983) (state judgment given preclusive
effect notwithstanding exclusive jurisdiction) and Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640
F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981) (same).
83. 470 U.S. 373, 386.
84. Like the Seventh Circuit in Marrese, the majority of lower federal court cases had made no
reference to section 1738. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470.
85. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger chided the Court for failing to provide more guidance to the district court. 470 U.S. at 387.
86. Id at 386 (citations omitted).
87. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). The Court applied § 1738 although it refused to decide whether plaintiff's Title VII suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. Id. at 506 n.20.
88. As the MarreseCourt noted, "Kremer implies that absent an exception to § 1738, state law
determines at least the issue preclusive effect of a prior state judgment in a subsequent action involving a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts." 470 U.S. at 381.
89. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
90. The MarreseCourt, juxtaposing Brown with Kremer, described Kremer as "finding no congressional intent to depart from § 1738 for purposes of Title VII" and Brown as "finding congressional intent that state judgments would not have claim preclusive effect on dischargeability issue in
bankruptcy." 470 U.S. at 386. In Brown, the Supreme Court considered the effect of a prior state
adjudication in a federal bankruptcy proceeding under § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1976) (repealed 1978). Curiously, though the Brown Court made no reference to the full faith and
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The GreaterPreclusion Question

The Marrese Court refused to entertain the possibility that the federal court could give claim-preclusive effect to the Illinois judgments,
even though the state judgments would not be preclusive under Illinois
law. 9 ' Presumably, Congress could divest federal courts of the power to
augment the preclusive effect of state judgments. 92 Twice in Marrese the
93
Court seemed to be saying that this was the effect of section 1738.
But Marrese's cursory treatment of the greater preclusion question
only perpetuates doctrinal confusion created by several recent Supreme
Court cases. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.94 and Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educaction95 suggested that federal
credit statute, it did declare: "While Congress did not expressly confront the problem created by
prebankruptcy state-court adjudications, it would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970
amendments to adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these [§ 17] questions away from bankruptcy courts and forces them back into state courts." 442 U.S. at 136; see also Atwood, supra note
50, at 73-75 (discussing the significance of Brown to § 1738 litigation).
91. The Court stated that § 1738
directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment was
rendered. "It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ
their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes
beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the
State from which the judgment is taken."
470 U.S. at 380 (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982)). That this
rule has "long been established" is a questionable assertion. See infra notes 106-07. Later the Court
asserted that, in Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), it had rejected
"the view that § 1738 allows a federal court to give a state court judgment greater preclusive effect
than the state courts themselves would give to it." 470 U.S. at 384; see also id. at 388 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (citing Migra for the proposition "that a federal court is not free to accord greater
preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts themselves would give to it").
92. Congress' authority to do so can be traced from article III of the Constitution. Article III
reposes the power to create lower federal courts in Congress, and it has long been clear that federal
courts may exercise only as much power as Congress has elaborated in subject matter jurisdiction
statutes. E.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). From Congress' authority to
grant jurisdiction to federal courts must be implied authority to diminish the courts' power. Congress may do this by repealing grants of subject matter jurisdiction or by restricting the availability
ofjudicial remedies. See generallyFrankfurter, DistributionofJudicialPowerBetween United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 507-11 (1928) (providing a history of the statutes that have
defined federal jurisdiction over federal question cases). For example, the authority of Congress to
withdraw the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions is beyond question. See Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.s. 182. 187-88 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). The
authority of Congress to impose choice-of-law directives on federal courts is equally clear. The most
prominent example is the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), which requires federal
courts to apply the "laws of the several states ... as rules of decision in civil actions" unless the
federal constitution, statutes, or treaties "otherwise require or provide."
93. See 470 U.S. at 383, 386.
94. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). Kremer held, "Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same
preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the
state from which the judgments emerged." Id. at 466. One commentator has gone so far as to read
Kremer as making "federal doctrine.., irrelevant." Smith, supra note 50, at 72.
95. 465 U.S. 75 (1984). The Migra Court declared, "It is now settled that a federal court must
give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the
law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Id. at 81; see also id. at 88 (White, J.,
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courts may not increase the preclusive effects of state judgments. 96 But
an intervening decision, Haringv. Prosise,97 appears neatly to counterbalance the implications of these two decisions. In Haring, the Court devoted several pages to discussing whether, on grounds of federal policy, it
could justify giving preclusive effect to a Virginia judgment when Virginia law would not.98 The Court decided against preclusion, but this
discussion suggests that when section 1738 does not require preclusion
because the judgment would not be preclusive under state law, preclusion
supported by federal doctrine remains a possibility. If section 1738 stood
as a per se bar to greater preclusion, the Court's discussion would have
been pointless. 9 9 In its crude way, Marrese may have tied the hands of
federal judges whenever they are called upon to give greater preclusive
effect to state judgments. Analytically, however, Marrese preserves the
dichotomy between Haring and the Kremer and Migra decisions by citing all three cases with approval. 100
concurring) (citing authorities for the proposition that a federal court may not increase the preclusive effects of state judgments).
96. It should be noted, however, that the greater preclusion issue was not before the Court in
Kremer, because the Court was satisfied that the New York judgment was preclusive under state
law. 456 U.S. at 466-67. And, the Court's analysis in Migra suggests that Ohio courts probably
would have regarded their judgment as preclusive as well. See 465 U.S. at 87. Both decisions focused on the obligation of federal courts under § 1738 to give as much preclusive effect to a state
judgment as that judgment would have in the state courts that rendered them.
97. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
98. Id. at 317-23. The Court similarly commented on the desirability of giving greater preclusive effect to the Illinois judgment in Marrese. Noting the position of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments against preclusion in cases like Marrese, the Court said: "[W]here state preclusion rules
do not indicate that a claim is barred, we do not believe that federal courts should fashion a federal
rule to preclude a claim that could not have been raised in the state proceedings." 470 U.S. at 384
n.3. Later the Court observed:
We are unwilling to create a special exception to § 1738 for federal antitrust claims that
would give state court judgments greater preclusive effect than would the courts of the
State rendering the judgment. Cf Haring v. Prosise... (refusing to create special preclusion rule for § 1983 claim subsequent to plaintiff's guilty plea).
Id. at 384. And, it labeled as "debatable" the contention that the court of appeals' approach in
Marrese would advance federal policies of economy and consolidation. Id. at 385.
99. The Haring Court seems to have made a distinction between the function of § 1738 in
authorizing or explaining a choice of preclusion law and the function of the statute in limiting
choices. The Supreme Court suggested that federal judges must follow § 1738 when they are faced
with state judgments that would be preclusive where rendered; in such cases § 1738 explains the
selection of state preclusion law. 462 U.S. at 313. However, at least in cases in which state courts
would not regard the judgment as preclusive, § 1738 does not require federal courts to apply only
state preclusion law. See id. at 314 n.8. That the Court ultimately declined to create a federal
preclusion rule is immaterial. Its very willingness to entertain the argument supports the authority
of federal courts-at least in some cases-to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments than
would the courts of the state rendering the judgment. For a more extensive discussion of the limiting
effect of Haringon § 1738 in greater preclusion cases, see infra text accompanying notes 237-44.
100. 470 U.S. at 380, 384-86. Since Marrese, however, the Supreme Court seems to have gone
further toward reading § 1738 as a categorical denial of federal court authority to give greater
preclusive effect to state judgments. In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768, 771-72
(1986), the Court reiterated the restrictive view it had taken in Kremer,Migra, and Marrese. Writing in Parsonsfor a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist made no reference to Haring.
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The problem is one of statutory interpretation. It is clear that, subject to constitutional restraints' 0 1 and the possibility of a statutory exception,10 2 section 1738 requires federal courts to give state judgments as
much preclusive effect as they would have under state law.10 3 This interpretation is essential to preserve the authority of the state judgment-rendering courts' °4 and to realize the statute's goal of establishing a parity of
obligation between state and federal enforcement courts.' 0 5 These policies fail to explain, however, why the statute's full faith and credit obligation also should compel federal courts to honor the limitations of state

preclusion law.
This is not to say that section 1738 is or should be without application in the latter situation. It is just that a separate rationale for explaining-and perhaps limiting-its application must be found.'0 6 The
Supreme Court renewed its interest in section 1738 as a choice-of-preclusion-law directive only recently107 The Court has yet to discuss, how101. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
103. The Supreme Court first asserted that § 1738 requires a federal court to give at least as
much preclusive effect to a judgment as it would receive in the court that rendered it in Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) discussedsupranotes 59-61 and accompanying text. The rule
has been restated in numerous cases. K g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 (1983); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Covington v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 101, 109 (1905). The
Allen Court put the matter simply, observing of § 1783: "Congress has specifically required all
federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged would do so .... " 449 U.S. at 96.
104. If other judicial systems could ignore the local authority of a state court's judgments, the
stature of that court would be impaired, and it would be impossible to find repose through the
formal resolution of controversies. Authorities are in unanimous agreement that these are central
purposes of preclusion. See supra note 32; see also Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 383, 385 (1985) (discussing the importance of giving repose to state judgments);
cf 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 15 ("Repose is the most
important product of res judicata."). The Supreme Court has placed a similar premium on repose
regarding federal judgments. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1983) (discussing
the importance of giving repose to federal judgments).
105. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
This assumes that an investigation of state preclusion law either yields an answer to the preclusion question or at least establishes a predicate for concluding how courts of the state would view
their own law under the same or substantially similar circumstances. See infra text following note
124. If, instead, state law is unavailing, federal courts probably should be permitted to chart an
independent course. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
106. Uncertainty over how much state preclusion law § 1738 ought to require federal courts to
apply has been noted elsewhere. See Atwood, supra note 50, at 71-72; Casad, Intersystem Issue
Preclusion, supra note 6, at 521-23; Casad, Introduction to Symposium: Preclusion in a FederalSystem, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 599, 600 (1985).
107. Before Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court had on occasion dealt
with prior state adjudications without utilizing state preclusion doctrine or § 1738. See Brown v.
Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In Montana, the Supreme Court decided,
without referring to § 1738, that a federal res judicata doctrine gave issue-preclusive effect to a
Montana judgment against the United States. Although defensible, the holding did represent a departure from the general rule that issue preclusion cannot be used to bind strangers to the prior
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ever, the greater preclusion problem thoughtfully or at any length. It is
hoped that the Court will acknowledge through its interpretation of section 1738 the need to give different treatment to greater preclusion cases.
D. Looking Ahead
Notwithstanding the criticisms of some commentators,10 8 recent
cases 0 9 prior to Marrese probably have been correct in requiring state
preclusion law to be followed.1 10 Under the circumstances presented in
Marrese, the Court also seems correct in ruling out the possibility that
greater effect could be given to the Illinois judgment.' 1 '
But it is regrettable that the Supreme Court has not developed an
interpretive approach that explains and harmonizes its various comments
on section 1738. Because of the absence of a cohesive analysis, the
Court's decisions shed insufficient light on how different and more diffiadjudication. See supra note 16. The only Montana preclusion case cited by the Court did not bear
on this issue, and it is unclear whether the Montana courts would have reached the same conclusion.
The Court commented that "considerations of comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of issues in a federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has chosen to litigate them in state
court." 440 U.S. at 163. The Court's general approach in Montana, however, was to treat the
preclusion issue as if it had arisen in a federal intramural setting, and the Court cited a number of
federal-judgment cases, including Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Lawlor v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); Hart
Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 (1917); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Sallfield, 241 U.S. 22
(1916); and Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897). Numerous lower federal court
decisions also have gauged the preclusive effects of state judgments by federal intramural doctrine.
See, eg., Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 666 (1lth Cir. 1984) (using principles of federalism in deciding not to give preclusive effect to state adjudication of constitutionality of
state statute); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (using federal standards to
deny preclusive effect to state court adjudication of claim under Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1303-1305 (1970)); Drier v. Tarpon Oil Co., 522 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1975) (using federal
standards to preclude relitigation in federal securities law case of issue of fact decided in a prior state
judgment).
Some commentators assert that it is improper to view § 1738 as a choice-of-preclusion-law directive. See, eg., Burbank, supra note 3, at 625 ("I believe that the full faith and credit statute does
not provide or choose preclusion law." (footnote omitted)); Comment, The Collateral-EstoppelEffect
to Be Given State-CourtJudgments in FederalSection 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1471,
1492 (1980) ("Section 1738 provides a weak statutory basis on which to build a system of preclusion
jurisprudence.").
Professor Burbank, in his interesting article, offers a choice-of-preclusion-law approach derived
from an interplay of federal common law and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
Although his arguments are imaginative, he has not yet demonstrated why § 1738 is an unsuitable
mechanism for regulating choice of preclusion law. And I agree with Professor Hazard that there
are serious questions concerning the plausibility of Professor Burbank's § 1652 theory. Hazard,
supra note 4, at 642-46. For the most recent presentation of Professor Burbank's views, see Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Federal Common Law: A General
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986).
108. See infra notes 183, 191, 197, 198, 206.
109. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
110. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
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cult federal cases should be decided in the future. In addition, the
Supreme Court needs to elaborate more fully a standard to aid federal
courts in determining when state preclusion law is so indecisive on the
questions before them that it may be disregarded. The balance of this
Article explores some of the possibilities for new development in this
area.
IV. The Process of Honoring State Preclusion Law Under Section
1738
A.

State Law as a Beginning Point

The Court's opinion in Marrese should eliminate the last vestiges of
resistance to the rule that section 1738 requires federal courts presented
with state judgments to consider state preclusion law. As recently as
1979, the Supreme Court's own decisions provided examples of federal
judicial independence from section 1738.112 In the following year, however, the Court signaled the reemergence of section 1738 as a force in
such cases. 113 Three subsequent cases stressed the importance of state
preclusion law to the application of section 1738.11 Marrese makes it
clear that not only must state preclusion law be examined, but, in most if
not all cases, the inquiry must begin there. 115
In Marrese, this meant that an investigation of Illinois preclusion
law had to precede the determination of whether an exception to section
1738 should be implied from exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court sought to justify this sequence by suggesting that if the
judgment was not preclusive under Illinois law, there would be no need
16
for answering the implied-exception question.'
Of course, the converse of this proposition makes just as much
sense. If the Court had begun with the implied-exception issue and had
112. See supra note 107.
113. Allen v. MeCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). The Court left open, however, the question of
bow the issue preclusive effect of the Missouri judgment was to be evaluated. Id. at 105 n.25.
114. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1984); Haring v.
Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314 (1983); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 & n.6
(1982). For a useful summary of these decisions, see Smith, supra note 50, at 65-81.
115. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375, 381, 386

(1985).
In certain situations, it may be desirable to differentiate claim preclusion from issue preclusion
in determining whether to apply the preclusion law of the place of the judgment. See 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 625, 641, 645-46. In several cases, however, the
Supreme Court has resisted such a distinction when discussing § 1738. See Marrese,470 U.S. at 383;
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-89 (1984); Migra 465 U.S. at 83-84; cf Atwood,
supra note 50, at 69 ("Although it has been suggested that issue preclusion may operate with less
force than does claim preclusion under § 1738, the cases do not support such a distinction.").
116. 470 U.S. at 383.
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concluded that an exception to section 1738 existed, a subsequent inquiry
into the content of Illinois state preclusion law would have been unnecessary. The federal case would be insulated from Illinois preclusion doctrine in order to protect exclusive antitrust jurisdiction.
Perhaps the Supreme Court's emphasis on the state-law inquiry as
the correct starting place, even in Marrese, is little more than a point of
intersystem etiquette; or it may be a manifestation of more substantial
concerns of comity and federalism.1 17 The Court's state-law preoccupation may also be a byproduct of a battle of wills between the Supreme
Court and its hierarchal inferiors over whether to take section 1738 seriously as a choice-of-law directive. Some federal courts of appeal have
18
seemed particularly slow to respond to the message of earlier decisions
concerning the significance that section 1738 gives to state preclusion
19
law.1
B.

Determining the Content of State PreclusionLaw-The
Insignificance of the Marrese Paradox and the Emergence
of a Useful Rule

Perhaps the most serious objection to Marrese's insistence on the
examination of Illinois state preclusion law is that, because of a paradox
created by the exclusive character of federal antitrust jurisdiction, it is
impossible for the same preclusion question ever to come up in the Illinois state courts. If plaintiffs had filed their federal antitrust complaints
in state rather than federal court, the Illinois courts would not have had
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the claim preclusive effect of the
prior Illinois judgments. Judge Posner used this point to justify using
federal rather than state preclusion law. 120 The Supreme Court insisted
that this paradox made no difference:
To be sure, a state court will not have occasion to address the
117. The Marrese Court noted that the full faith and credit statute "embodies concerns of comity
and federalism." Id. at 380. The Court made a similar observation in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 96 (1980).
In a different context, the Supreme Court invoked concerns of federalism in ruling that federal
courts should not adjudicate questions of state law. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (eleventh amendment bars federal court adjudication of state claims
against state officials); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
118. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
119. Judge Posner's plurality opinion in Marreseis an example. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); see also
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 666-67 (11th Cir. 1984) (invoking federal
rather than Georgia law to determine the issue-preclusive effect of a Georgia state judgment).
120. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1154(7th Cir.
1984) (plurality opinion). Professor Burbank takes the same position. See Burbank, supra note 81,
at 664 & n.3.
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specific question whether a state judgment has issue or claim
preclusive effect in a later action that can be brought only in federal court. Nevertheless, a federal court may rely in the first instance on state preclusion principles to determine the extent
to
121
which an earlier state judgment bars subsequent litigation.
Judge Posner's abortive attempt to finesse the state law question
draws attention to a frailty in the Court's emerging section 1738 analysis.
Marrese and other recent cases make clear that the Court has imposed a
bifurcated regime of preclusion law on federal courts. In the intramural
sphere, the preclusive effect of federal judgments usually will be determined by consulting federal doctrine. 122 In the intersystem sphere, the
preclusive effect of state judgments usually will be determined by consulting state doctrine. 123 But surely this cannot mean that federal courts
are confined to state law when state preclusion law is so undeveloped or
so hopelessly confused that it cannot provide an answer.
Because of the featured role that its recent section 1738 decisions
give to state preclusion law, the Court will have to deal with this problem. The Court's response in Marrese was less definitive than the Chief
Justice wished,124 but the Court did offer at least the beginnings of a
sensible choice-of-preclusion-law approach. By acknowledging that state
preclusion law could provide answers in cases not subject to state court
adjudication, the Court evinced a willingness to honor the spirit as well
as the letter of state law in section 1738 cases. With further judicial refinement, this approach could lead to a rule that, absent a statutory exception, section 1738 requires that state judgments be preclusive in
federal court whenever the conclusion of preclusion is suggested from an
examination of state preclusion law. This rule will facilitate the application of state preclusion law when federal courts are exercising jurisdiction concurrent with that of state courts, and it will also extend to
situations in which, because of a disability created either by federal or
local law, courts of the state could not exercise jurisdiction over the same
case. What matters is whether, by examining the whole of state preclusion law, the federal court can derive an answer for the case at hand.
Judge Posner's approach seems superficial in contrast. It was a mistake for him to rely on the paradox created by exclusive federal antitrust
jurisdiction as an a priori demonstration of the inability of Illinois state
preclusion law to provide guidance in Marrese. Taken to its logical conclusion, Judge Posner's position extends well beyond exclusive-jurisdic121.
122.
123.
124.
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tion settings. It suggests that, in determining the preclusive effect of state
judgments, federal courts must give weight to state decisions only when
they are entirely on point. This reading of section 1738 as a choice-oflaw directive is too technical and narrow. Respect for the state origin of
the judgment requires federal courts to examine all of the state's preclusion law.1 25 Granted, the paradox created by exclusive federal jurisdic1 26
tion might make an examination of state preclusion law more difficult,
but, if Marrese serves as a guide, these difficulties may not be
insurmountable.
One question that Illinois law might help answer is whether a state
court may preclude by its judgment matters that it would have been incompetent to adjudicate.1 27 Inasmuch as the authority of a particular
state court to adjudicate can be limited by state as well as federal law,
this is a question that Illinois can answer through its intramural preclusion doctrine.1 28 Illinois law also might indicate whether the relationship
between plaintiff's federal antitrust claims and the Illinois constitutional,
and common-law claims adjudicated in the prior proceeding is sufficient
125. When no case on point can be found, it is always appropriate for a federal court to search
elsewhere in state preclusion law for guidance. Consider the example provided by Haring v. Prosise,
462 U.S. 306 (1983), a case brought within the federal court's concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court was faced with a specific preclusion issue that the Virginia courts could have (but had not)
addressed. The Court adopted the same approach it later took in Marrese, stating: "Because there is
no Virginia decision precisely on point, we must look for guidance to Virginia decisions concerning
collateral estoppel generally." Id. at 314.
The problem is really no different from that posed by the Marrese paradox in reverse: when
should a state court should use federal law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment in
a case a federal court would never hear? Such cases would seem to pose no insurmountable obstacle
in reaching the conclusion that federal preclusion law controls. For example, see the discussion of
the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment on a subsequent state court adjudication of state
antitrust claims that could have been (but were not) offered in the federal suit under a theory of
pendent jurisdiction. Infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
126. The number of federal preclusion cases purporting to follow state law suggests that frequently it will not be difficult to ascertain and apply state preclusion law. See generally 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4469 (providing an annotation of such cases).
For a discussion of the general process of ascertaining state law, see Note, FederalInterpretationof
State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 MINN. L. REv. 806 (1976).
127. The MarreseCourt suggested that "[t]o the extent that state preclusion law indicates that a
judgment normally does not have claim preclusive effect as to matters that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain .... a state court judgment does not bar a subsequent federal antitrust claim." 470
U.S. at 383.
128. In determining Illinois law on this point on remand, the courts are likely to give attention to
Spiller v. Continental Tube Co., 95 Ill. 2d 432, 447 N.E.2d 834 (1983), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that preclusion extended "not only to questions which were actually litigated but also
to all questions which could have been raised or determined." Id. at 432, 447 N.E.2d at 838. Petitioners urged in argument before the United States Supreme Court that Spiller carried the negative
implication that the original adjudication could preclude only questions that could have been raised
in that adjudication. Joint Reply to the Brief of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons in
Opposition to the Joint Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Respondent argued that Spiller did not invite such a
reading. Brief for Respondent at 11.
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to support preclusion. 129 Although the paradox130 will prevent Illinois
courts from comparing a successive federal antitrust claim with prior
state claims, Illinois courts can compare the prior state claims with a
3
subsequent claim under Illinois' similar state antitrust statute.' '
Whether a search actually leads to disclosure of Illinois precedents
shedding light on these two questions is beside the point. Federal courts
directed by section 1738 to examine state preclusion law always face the
possibility that state doctrinal developments may not reach questions
raised in the case at hand. Analytic difficulties resulting when this happens are reminiscent of those that federal courts encounter under the
Rules of Decision Act.132 But, because of the difference in the force of
the two choice-of-law directives, it should be much easier for federal
courts to revert to federal law in truly problematic cases under section
1738 than it would be in cases under section 1652.
There is a significant difference between the power of Congress to
choose between choice-of-law approaches for the recognition of state
rules of decision and for the recognition of state preclusion law. Concerning state rules of decision, the Supreme Court has held, beginning
with Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 133 that federal judges could not displace
state substantive law merely because their diversity jurisdiction had been
invoked. One can argue that a reading of the Rules of Decision Act less
deferential to state law than the one given in Erie would be unconstitutional. "3 In contrast, Congress enjoys much greater latitude in deter129. For an explanation of how claims are compared under the doctrine of claim preclusion, see
supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
131. The more alike the state and federal statutes are, the more useful will be the analogy. See
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1176 n.8 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J.,dissenting) (listing several Illinois cases that plaintiff cited for the proposition that
Illinois courts would not bar a subsequent suit under the state antitrust statute), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373
(1985).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). Section 1652 questions are usually discussed by reference to the
doctrine of interpretation evolving from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Ascertaining
state law when it is "confused or nonexistent" is a chronic problem under Erie. Clark, State Law in
the FederalCourts: The Brooding OmnipresenceofErie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290 (1946).
Professor Smith has suggested that inquiries about state preclusion law may be, on the whole, less
problematic than state law inquiries under the Erie doctrine. Smith, supra note 50, at 111. Certainly, some Erie-mandated inquiries are of surpassing difficulty. For example, federal diversity
judges are required under Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), to apply state
conflicts law. Because of the inherent difficulty of conflicts doctrine and distortions brought about
by local choice-of-law bias, it may be very hard to determine the law's content. See Shreve, In
Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflectionson Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66
MINN. L. REv. 327, 339 & n.63 (1982).
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Swift had read the Rules of Decision Act
to permit federal diversity courts to devise and apply their own general common law instead of
applying the decisional law of the forum state. Writing for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis
addressed Swift in the following manner: "If only a question of statutory construction were in-
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mining how much recognition federal courts must give to state
judgments. The Constitution might even allow Congress to repeal section 1738 and permit federal courts to ignore state judgments
altogether. 135
Because Congress has a wider scope of permissible options under
section 1738 and because the statute's interpretation is still unsettled, 136
the Supreme Court presently has flexibility in developing a choice-of-law
approach for section 1738. If state preclusion law is undeveloped or
hopelessly unclear, it should not be difficult for the Court to approve

application of federal preclusion law.
In his Marrese concurrence, Chief Justice Burger appeared to endorse a measure of federal-court autonomy when state preclusion law
was not helpful. 137 He stressed the importance of certainty to the goal of
volved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a
century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us
to do so." 304 U.S. at 77-78. Although subsequently noting that Erie "indicated that Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of
citizenship cases," Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956), the Supreme
Court has not chosen to clarify or refine the point.
A number of commentators have endorsed the suggestion in Erie that the decision was necessary to preserve a constitutional principle. See, eg., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 392-98 (1964) (stating that the constitutional ground
taken in Erie was not only right, but also the only tenable ground that could be taken); Mishkin,
Some FurtherLast Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1688 (1974) (observing
that the constitutional underpinnings of Erie constitute the essential unity of the decision); Wechsler,
FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239
n.121 (1948) (stating that the constitutional language of Erie was necessary to correct an act of
usurpation); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1084, 1086 (1964) (arguing that the constitutional decision in Erie was "consonant with the
basic premises of American federalism"). Others have questioned the premise. See, e-g., Clark,
supra note 132, at 278-79 (observing that "it seems clear that Congress may determine the manner
and form of adjudication of rights which under the Constitution may be committed to the federal
courts"); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 197 (1957) (stating that "the Court's decisions offer little guidance as to the
position it will adopt if called upon to determine whether Erie announces a constitutional limitation
on the power of Congress and the federal courts"); cf.ALI STuDY, supra note 80, at 442 (noting that
"it does not necessarily follow that the Erie holding was constitutionally compelled in the technical
sense of being legally imposed by the fundamental instrument"); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie,
87 HARV.L. REV. 693 (1974) (suggesting a less restrictive role for the Constitution and a commensurately greater range of choice-of-law options for Congress). For an excellent overview of the subject, see C. WRIGHr, supra note 25, at 359-64.
135. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that when state law is ambiguous, comity and federalism
do not come into play and a clear federal rule should be applied). If, instead, the Court's prior
§ 1738 decisions clearly barred recourse to federal preclusion law in cases in which state preclusion
law was unavailing, constraints of statutory stare decisis might make it difficult for the court to
adopt a more flexible view. See infra note 180.
137. The Chief Justice felt that "it is likely that the principles of Illinois claim preclusion law do
not speak to the preclusive effect that petitioners' state court judgments should have on the present
action." 470 U.S. at 390. He suggested that "in this situation, it may be consistent with § 1738 for a
federal court to formulate a federal rule to resolve the matter." Id.
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repose in preclusion law, but this may not be the strongest argument for
his conclusion. It is true that certainty facilitates repose and that repose
is a major goal of preclusion law. 138 Yet, it is probably also true that the
certainty a clear federal governing rule promotes is offset by uncertainty
that the following question generates: At what point is state law sufficiently undeveloped or unclear that reversion to federal doctrine is tolerable under section 1738? The dividing line between those cases in which
state law may be said to point the way and those in which it does not will
13 9
be, at best, indistinct.
The best justification for ultimately disregarding indeterminate state
preclusion law may be that federal courts are not authoritative expositors
of the meaning of state law. If state courts face a problem of uncertainty
in the meaning of state law, it is cured through adjudication of the case.
State courts will, in other words, add to their law whatever new meaning
is necessary to explain and support their resolution of the controversy.
Uncertain state law presents federal judges with far greater difficulty.
They usually can neither enlist the assistance of state judges 4° nor decline jurisdiction because of the difficulty of state-law questions. 41 Instead, they must "vicariously"'' 4 2 create enough state law to decide the
case at hand by attempting to "forecast" the state's law "as it would be
expressed by its highest court."' 143 The process transforms federal courts
into analytically-handicapped state court surrogates, forced to speculate
on the nature of governing law and unable to work significant changes on
138. See supra notes 32, 104.
139. Marrese may be close to the line. My position is that Illinois law is significant if it suggests
preclusion; in his Marrese concurrence, Chief Justice Burger questioned the usefulness of Illinois
jurisdictional competence cases in determining the preclusive effect of state court judgments on federal antitrust claims. 470 U.S. at 390.
140. "Except in those few jurisdictions permitting a federal court to certify an unsettled question
of state law to the state's highest court, a federal court's decision on state law cannot be corrected,
for the benefit of the litigants in the particular case, by the state's authoritative tribunal." Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). For
a case in which certification was used, see Strange v. Krebs, 658 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981).
141. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). With a few exceptions, federal diversity courts have been required to decide cases even when state law is unsettled. See J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[3] (2d
ed. 1985). But cf Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (stating
that the district judge correctly stayed proceedings pending intepretation of statute by Supreme
Court of Louisiana).
142. The term is from 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4507, at 100.
143. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 449
U.S. 976 (1980). This test for determining the content of state law in federal court is based on the
realization that, just as the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the meaning of
federal law, the ultimate authority on the meaning of state law is the state's highest court. The
principle is well established. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 182 n.3 (1983); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
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its content.44 Of course, the reach of state law similarly confines federal
judges in cases decided under section 1652,145 but only section 1738
presents federal courts with the means to elaborate what is, in the fullest
sense, a choice-of-law approach. For, although it is appropriate under
either statute for a federal court to build on the implications of state law
in order to honor that law, 146 the explicit choice offederal law and policy

when state law is unclear is constitutionally legitimate only under section
1738.147 So long as federal courts give proper respect to the clear suggestions of state law, section 1738 is capable of supporting a flexible and
pragmatic approach in selecting the proper preclusion rule.
Whether Illinois law is too undeveloped to be helpful in Marrese is a
144. At times, when a federal decision on the meaning of state law has not been eclipsed by an
intervening state decision, it has been followed by a subsequent federal court. See, e.g., Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining why the Second Circuit followed
the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee law), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). But it is clear
that the courts of a state are free to disregard all federal court pronouncements-even those of the
United States Supreme Court---concerning the meaning of state law. Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941) (stating that the state courts, rather than the United States
Supreme Court, had "the last word on ... [the] statutory authority" of a state agency). And the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to look to state courts for "an authoritative construction" of state law. See Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308 (1979).
145. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supranote 21, at 710; supra note
132.
146. For example, federal courts must examine the decisions of lower state courts when there are
no state high court decisions on point. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465
(1967). If state law does not answer the preclusion question explicitly, it should usually at least
provide a basis for predicting how state courts would answer the question. See supra note 125. The
process of prediction can be interesting as well as controversial. Compare Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 909 (1st Cir. 1957) (holding that federal court was not obligated to
apply Mississippi law in view of the Mississippi Supreme Court's indication that the law would be
revised soon) with Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (because state law was
silent on issue, federal judge applied law that he believed state court would apply if they had the
opportunity to do so). In Mason, a federal diversity court took notice of a national trend in tort law
and some inapposite Mississippi case law to predict that the Mississippi Supreme Court would repudiate its privity limitation on recovery. The prophecy was fulfilled in State Stove Mfg. Co. v.
Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). In Crutsinger, a federal
court gave issue-preclusive effect to a Kansas judgment, concluding from its survey of Kansas law
and national developments that, if given the opportunity, the Kansas Supreme Court would abandon
its mutuality requirement. It is at least arguable that the Crutsinger court took excessive liberties
with Kansas law. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 688 n.14 (discussing Crutsinger).
147. For example, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the absence of guiding Illinois state law
might leave the federal court in Marrese free to pursue propreclusion policies, "ensuring that their
resources are used efficiently and not as a means of harassing defendants with repetitive lawsuits
.... Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (Burger,
CJ., concurring). In contrast, under § 1652 federal courts do not seem authorized to apply federal
law. Despite eloquent arguments to the contrary, see Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50
YALE L.J. 762, 775-77 & 777 n.17 (1941), reversion to purely federal law has not become an option
in Erie settings, no matter how muddled or undeveloped state law might be. The greatest role federal law can play under § 1652 is as part of the data used to predict how the highest state court
would decide the same case. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). On sources for determining state law generally, see
Note, supra note 126.
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matter of controversy. 148 Even if the federal courts conclude on remand
that it is too undeveloped, it would be unfortunate if the Seventh Circuit
uses as the federal standard the exaggerated preclusion rule advanced in
Judge Posner's opinion. The obstacle to claim preclusion in Marrese
arises from the relatively weak nexus between the state common law and
constitutional claims presented by the petitioners in the original state
proceeding and the petitioners' subsequent federal antitrust claims.
Judge Posner avoided this hurdle by stressing the nexus between the federal antitrust claims and the claims under the Illinois state antitrust statute, which petitioners could have raised in their Illinois case.1 4 9 This
notion-that all the claims, however dissimilar, that plaintiff could have
brought in the original case should be used to determine the scope of
preclusion-is not new. 150 The reasons for rejecting it continue to have
force. 15
V.

The Proper Scope of Implied Statutory Exceptions
to Section 1738

A.

A Suggested Test

If we assume that Illinois doctrine would give claim preclusive effect
to Marrese's prior adjudication, 152 is it plausible that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims functions as an implied exception to section 1738?
There is a certain symmetry to the implied-exception argument. It
is hard to see much difference between depriving federal courts of the
opportunity to adjudicate federal antitrust claims because they have al148. See supra text accompanying note 76, and notes 127, 137 and accompanying text.
149. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (7th
Cir. 1984).
150. See, e.g., F. JAMES, supra note 38, at 555 n.13 (citing authorities).
151. "Where ... claims are factually quite distinct so that there will be no overlap in presenting
evidence to support them, much less is to be saved by trying them together, or including them in a
single lawsuit to be tried separately. Indeed, trying them together may cause confusion and prejudice." Id at 555. Professor James also suggests that fear of claim waiver generated by the rule
might force parties to introduce claims that would not otherwise have been litigated. Id And, he
notes that consequences from the omission of insufficiently related claims would be too severe:
"Hardship from oversight would be greatly multiplied if the parties were bound to think of all the
aspects of all possible claims against their adversaries." Id. at 556. For further criticisms of this
approach, see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4412, at 93-106; Cleary,
supra note 9, at 347. But cf Berch, supranote 16, at 533 (arguing that absentees similarly situated to
claimants should be precluded by adjudications in which they had an opportunity to participate by
intervention); Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1551, 1565 (1979) (same).
152. The question is discussed supra notes 128, 137. The Supreme Court directed an examination of Illinois law on remand. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 387 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 76.

1238

Preclusion and Choice of Law
ready been adjudicated in state court, and depriving federal courts of the
same opportunity because the federal antitrust claim-although not
raised in the prior state proceeding-is sufficiently related to a state
claim that was, or could have been, raised in the earlier state action such
that it now should be precluded. Exclusive federal jurisdiction addresses
the first situation by confining federal antitrust claims to federal court.
A consistent approach would prevent state judgments from precluding
claims that exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction would not permit them
to adjudicate.
Perhaps the chief difficulty with this argument is that Congress
could have required consistent results but has failed to do so. Both section 1738 and federal antitrust statutes are silent concerning the possible
claim preclusive effects of state judgments on subsequent federal antitrust
cases. The Supreme Court has noted that its power to suspend section
1738's requirement that state judgments be enforced must derive from
statutory interpretation. 153 The Court has evinced an understandable reluctance to partially repeal section 1738 under the guise of statutory interpretation; 154 therefore the test to be met for implying an exception to
section 1738 must be exacting.
In light of the Court's attitude, more than a demonstration that suspension of section 1738 would complement the purposes of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction should be required to establish an implied
exception to section 1738. The Supreme Court should expressly declare
what it has intimated:1 55 An implied exception should be found in cases
like Marrese only if preclusion by state judgment would so frustrate the
purposes served by exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction as to make the
suspension of section 1738 implicit in the creation of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The appropriate measure for such a test is the difference
between the effective operation of exclusive antitrust jurisdiction with
and without suspension of section 1738.
B.

Resolving the Implied-Exception Issue in Marrese
From the vantage provided in Marrese, it does not appear that a

153. "[A]n exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express
or implied partial repeal." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982).
154. In Kremer, the Court noted: "It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored." 456 U.S. at 468 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross
& Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)). The Supreme Court reiterated the point in its post-Marresedecision, Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768, 772 (1986), when it refused to use the
"relitigation" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), to imply an exception
to § 1738.
155. See supra notes 90, 153-54.
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refusal to suspend section 1738 would so harm the effective operation of
exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction as to justify implying an exception
to the statute. This is so because the benefits of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction have so diminished that in most cases it scarcely matters whether exclusive federal jurisdiction is insulated from the preclusive
156
effects of state judgments.
Much of the discrete significance that federal antitrust law had
when the Supreme Court determined federal jurisdiction to be exclusive
over sixty years ago1 57 is now gone. Intervening years have seen the
proliferation of state antitrust statutes. 158 Some state statutes are so similar to federal law that federal antitrust decisions are used to interpret
them. 159 In other instances, state courts have read their statutes to provide opportunities for antitrust recovery unavailable under federal law. 160
A recent study suggests that antitrust claimants are exhibiting a growing
161
preference for state courts.
The object of exclusive antitrust jurisdiction was, as with any grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction, to enhance enforcement of federal law.
This purpose is accomplished by providing for uniform interpretation and application of federal laws, preventing state court bias and
misapplication of those laws, assuring that federal judges can utilize their expertise in adjudicating federal claims, and allowing for
jury trial and the use of extensive federal discovery and evidence
rules. 162
To the extent that federal antitrust law continues to stand apart from
state law, however, the protections offered by exclusive federal jurisdiction are to a large extent both ineffectual and unnecessary.
To begin with, exclusive federal jurisdiction does not direct all federal antitrust questions to federal courts. State courts can and do adjudicate federal antitrust defenses raised in response to state claims.1 63 Two
156. See infra note 182 (noting special circumstances, not suggested in Marrese, when an exception to § 1738 might be implied).
157. See supra note 80.
158. About forty states had enacted their own antitrust laws by 1963. Hanson & von Kalinowski, The Status ofState Antitrust Laws with FederalAnalysis, 15 W. RESERVE L. REV. 9, 910 (1963).
159. Id. at 13; Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal System, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 377 n.10
(1983).
160. Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 377 n.10.
161. Id. at 378.
162. Note, Estoppel-Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 81, at 1282. For additional surveys of
the intended effects of exclusive federal jurisdiction, see M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 112-13 (1980); Note, JudicialAbstention and Ex-

clusive FederalJurisdiction: A Reconciliation, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 232 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, JudicialAbstention].
163. See Comment, State Judgments-FederalAntitrust,supra note 81, at 955; Note, EstoppelExclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 81, at 1285-86; Comment, Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Effects of
State Court Findings, 8 STAN. L. REV. 439, 447 (1956).
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factors explain this. First, limitations on federal subject matter jurisdiction prohibit filing a case in federal court or removing a state case to
federal court solely because of the existence of an affirmative defense
based on federal law. 16" Second, not only may a state court entertain
federal question affirmative defenses, but, under the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution, the state court must do so before deciding
against the party raising the defense.1 65 This means that only federal

antitrust claims can be thought of as within the exclusive preserve of the
1

66

federal courts.
Even if parties litigated all federal antitrust questions in federal
court, it is unlikely that anything approaching genuine uniformity of interpretation could be achieved. Although one cannot doubt the function
of the Supreme Court in elaborating uniform federal law,1 67 the Court "is
no longer capable of providing the supervision of federal judicial lawmaking that it once provided."1 68 The lack of effective Supreme Court
164. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Tennessee v. Union &
Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Mottley held that a federal question issue that is not necessary
to a well pleaded complaint but only appears in the answer as an affirmative defense is outside the
scope of the general federal question statute-now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The same limitation has
been imposed on the alternative federal question basis for antitrust suits--28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
See Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 316 U.S. 350, 353 (1942) (citing, inter alia, Mottley).
The Planter'sBank case held that a case filed in state court is not removable to federal court if the
only federal issue appears in the answer to the complaint. See 152 U.S. at 460. The result of these
rulings, ironically, is to confer a kind of exclusive jurisdiction on state courts in cases raising a
federal question only as an affirmative defense. An American Law Institute recommendation would
provide a general remedy to this situation by broadening federal statutory removal of controversies
exceeding $10,000 to reach cases involving a federal issue even if raised only in an affirmative defense. See ALI STUDY, supra note 80, at 195 (proposed § 1312(a)(2)). Broadened statutory removal
also has been advocated with particular reference to state-court affirmative defenses addressing the
subject matter of federal exclusive jurisdiction. See Note, Estoppel-Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra
note 81, at 1305-06; cf Dickinson, Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Role of the States in Securities Regulation, 65 IowA L. REV. 1201, 1245-47 (1980) (advocating a similar proposal for statecourt defenses based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982), which
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction).
165. M. REDISH, supra note 162, at 124; Note, Estoppel-Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 81,
at 1303.
166. It is not even settled that all claims are within the exclusive preserve of federal antitrust
jurisdiction. State decisions are divided over whether state courts have the authority to entertain
federal antitrust counterclaims. Compare Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp. v. H. Wales Lines Co.,
119 Conn. 603, 178 A. 659 (1935) (dismissing federal antitrust counterclaims) and Reed Enters., Inc.
v. Books, Inc., 110 R.I. 179, 291 A.2d 261 (1972) (holding that defendant's counterclaim for damages under the Clayton Act is not subject matter over which the state court has jurisdiction) with
City Trade & Indus., Ltd. v. New Cent. Jute Mills Co., 25 N.Y.2d 49, 250 N.E.2d 52, 302 N.Y.S.2d
557 (1969) (permitting state-court adjudication of federal antitrust counterclaims) and State ex rel.
W. Va. Truck Stop, Inc. v. Belcher, 156 W. Va. 183, 192 S.E.2d 229 (1972) (upholding state-court
adjudication of compulsory counterclaim alleging violation of federal antitrust laws).
167. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 210-11 (1976);
Betten, InstitutionalReform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63, 68 (1976).
168. Carrington, supra note 21, at 553. The Supreme Court has traditionally kept abreast of its
workload. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 43 (5th ed. 1978). Increasingly,
however, this is possible only by truncating the process of decision in some cases and evading deci-
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superintendence 16 9 has placed federal courts of appeal in a position "to
create and to balkanize national law." 170 Appellate courts have created
considerable confusion and some conflict over the meaning of federal law
17 1
at both intracircuit and intercircuit levels.
Moreover, in the antitrust setting, the need for the other "advantages" of exclusive federal jurisdiction is questionable. The possibility
that judges might be biased against or misunderstand federal law-always difficult to establish172-seems particularly unlikely because antitrust causes of action have become a familiar part of state law.173 The
significance of the federal courts' antitrust expertise has diminished for
the same reason. Jury trials (a mixed blessing in antitrust cases' 7 4) may
be more available in federal court, 75 but plaintiffs' increasing partiality
Sion in others. See generally Griswold, RationingJustice-The Supreme Court's Caseloadand What
the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. Rv. 335 (1975) (highlighting the problem of "rationed
justice" that necessarily arises in keeping the Court from being overworked).
169. According to a prominent study:
Supreme Court review has become an exceedingly unlikely event in most federal litigation.
Of about 8,000 cases decided after hearing and submission in the courts of appeals, only
about one in a 100 will be given full consideration by the Supreme Court. Of the cases
tried in the district courts, about one in 300 reaches the Supreme Court.
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 209.
170. Betten, supra note 167, at 68.
171. The primary means of resolving intracircuit conflict has been en banc rehearing before the
entire circuit. It has been suggested that "the en banc device is foundering." P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 201. The tortured Seventh Circuit history of Marrese offers some confirmation. See supra text preceeding note 67.
Differing approaches at the intercircuit level undoubtedly lead to some conflicts and may be at
least problematic in causing extended confusion before conflicts coalesce. P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 212-13.
Finally, consider Professor Bator's assessment of the argument that federal court adjudications
enhance uniformity of federal constitutional law:
There is no reason to think that the federal district courts will achieve more uniform results
with respect to questions of federal constitutional law than the supreme courts of the fifty
states. Review by the courts of appeals does, of course, create some centripetal force. But
it is notorious that, with twelve [now 13] circuits and increasing numbers of judges on
them, the prospects of inter- and intracircuit conflicts are substantial and increasing.
Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 636
n.68 (1981).
172. Even commentators who argue that federal courts provide better federal law adjudications
than state courts concede that their position is difficult to document. M. REDISH, supranote 162, at
3; Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.725,
726 (1981).
173. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
174. Antitrust suits can provide the kind of complex litigation capable of overwhelming juries.
Current problems have generated an interesting debate over the right to trial by jury. Compare
Lempert, Civil Juriesand Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981)
(discussing the difficulties in limiting jury trials) with Luneberg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternativesfor Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil
Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887 (1981) (discussing alternatives to jury trials in complex litigation).
175. "State law may deny a jury trial in a case where the Seventh Amendment requires a jury
trial" in federal court. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 606-07 (4th ed. 1983).
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for state antitrust forums 176 suggests that the lack of a state jury trial is
not important, at least to them. Finally, whatever special advantages litigants in federal court derive from the federal rules of civil procedure and
evidence have diminished as an increasing number of states have adopted
177
those rules for use in their courts.
Developments since the Supreme Court ruled federal antitrust jurisdiction to be exclusive 178 have, in short, greatly lessened both the need
for and the advantages of exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement of
federal antitrust law. 179 It is unlikely that the Court will overrule its
decisions requiring exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal antitrust
claims. 180 Nonetheless, because the purposes served by exclusive anti176. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
177. By 1984, 29 states had adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in various forms. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, RULES AND STATUTE SUPPLEMENT T-1 (1985).

About the same number of states have also adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cf.
Shreve, QuestioningIntervention of Right-Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking,74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 894, 897 n.14 (1980) (surveying states using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24).
178. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922); Blumenstock Bros.
Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1920).
179. As early as 1957, an observer wrote:
Several considerations relating to the antitrust law and to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 indicate instances in which exclusive jurisdiction may be inappropriate. That uniformity is not a significant factor in these fields is indicated by the coexistence of parallel
state and federal statutes. Similarly, the disparity of experience between the two systems is
diminished, since state and federal courts are adjudicating closely related claims.
Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction-PrivateActions, supra note 81, at 515. But see Comment, State Judgments--Federal Antitrust, supra note 81, at 965 (stressing "the particularly complex character of
antitrust litigation and the greater expertise of federal judges in this area").
180. It often seems that the Court will give greater stare decisis effect to its settled interpretations of statutes than it will either to its constitutional decisions or its diminishing number of common law precedents. This hierarchical view of stare decisis is not universally accepted, see B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1921), but it is defensible. Congress is
presumed to acquiesce in the judicial interpretations of its statutes when it does not overrule them by
statutory amendment. This can be seen as a kind of retrospective legislative intent. Moreover, if the
Court were more willing to reinterpret statutes, this might sap Congress' initiative to review and
periodically revise statutory law. Therefore, "once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has
been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should
take that direction as given."

E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 23 (1948). For

examples of the force of stare decisis given to the Court's interpretation of federal jurisdictional
statutes, see Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (adhering to precedents barring the aggregation of
separate claims to satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement for diversity jurisdiction, notwithstanding the suggestion that provision for broadened federal class actions under revised Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 should be read to permit aggregation); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (adhering to precedents requiring a federal issue to arise within plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint, notwithstanding the suggestion that the Declaratory Judgment Act 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), authorized plaintiff to anticipate federal issues defendant might raise in a suit
for coercive relief). But see Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970). In that case, the Court overruled a prior interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
concluded that a lower federal court had jurisdiction to enjoin a violation of a no-strike clause in a
collective bargaining contract. Dissenting, Justice Black wrote: "When the law has been settled by
an earlier case then any subsequent 'reinterpretation' of the statute is gratuitous and neither more
nor less than an amendment: it is no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that
Congress itself placed in the statute." 398 U.S. at 257-58.
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trust jurisdiction are on the wane, it would be particularly inappropriate
for the Court now to imply an exception to section 1738 based on federal
antitrust jurisdiction. 8 1 In any event, the Court could not substantially
recreate the benefits of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction by suspending the full faith and credit statute.18 2
C. Implied-Exception Issues in Other Cases
It is tempting to go further and suggest that rarely should exclusive
federal jurisdiction justify an implied exception to section 1738, but admonitions to proceed carefully'1 3 probably are warranted. The strength
of the implied-exception argument will vary from one type of exclusive
jurisdiction to another.' 8 4 And, although the foregoing analysis suggests
that exclusive antitrust jurisdiction generally does not justify an implied
exception to section 1738, an exception probably should be found to prevent state court determinations of fact from precluding a defense against
181. This is at least true in cases, like Marrese, in which the question is not whether state-court
determinations of fact preclude the federal defendant from resisting a subsequent federal-court claim
for treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). When a federal treble damages claim is at issue, it is
arguable that to give preclusive effect to the state proceeding might exaggerate its importance and
that, because two-thirds of such an award is bottomed on penal policies of federal law (making
plaintiffs, in essence, private federal prosecutors), a stronger case can be made for full adjudication in
federal court. At the same time, it seems unwarranted for federal courts to go further and imply an
exception to § 1738 to permit federal claimants to relitigate facts underlying their treble-damage
claims.
182. Assuming it would be desirable for federal antitrust law to pose uniform standards and for
determination of those standards to be entrusted only to federal judges, congressional initiatives will
be necessary to make it possible.
State-court adjudication of federal antitrust defenses, see supra note 164 and accompanying text,
would be unaffected by implying an exception to § 1738. Congress would have to amend the Judicial Code so that cases in which federal antitrust questions arise only as affirmative defenses can be
filed in or removed to federal court. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
And it would take further congressional action to achieve substantive uniformity by changing
the present nonpreemptive posture of federal antitrust law. "Most real cases are adequately covered
by the general rule that state antitrust law may be enforced even though it prohibits less, the same, or
more than federal antitrust law." 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW-AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 208, at 5 (1978). Inasmuch as federal
antitrust law has been interpreted to leave state antitrust law free to provide broader remedies or
causes of action, see Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 377 n. 10, 389-90, states remain free to devise
rival approaches in determining the measure of accountability for anticompetitive practices.
183. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470, at 689 (noting "intimate knowledge of each grant of exclusive jurisdiction and the related substantive law" to be a
prerequisite to determining whether an implied exception should be found); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment d (1982) ("Whether a scheme of federal remedies implies
an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ... is a matter of statutory interpretation. However, the intention
of Congress to make such an exception should not be readily inferred."); supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Marrese, Brown, and Kremer and their explanations of when courts have
found exceptions to § 1738 acceptable).
184. Presumably, the more important it is for a type of adjudication to be in federal court, the
stronger becomes the basis for arguing an exception to § 1738. Thus, the Supreme Court seems to
have read federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to create an exception. See supra note 90 and its discussion of Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
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a subsequent treble-damage claim in federal court.18 5 Perhaps the most
that can be said is that there should be a presumption against implying
an exception to section 1738 from exclusive federal jurisdiction '8 6 in order to guard against judicial overreaching,1 8 7 reinforce the finality of
state judgments,18 8 and promote harmony between state and federal
courts. 1 8 9

The answer to the question whether the exercise of the federal
court's concurrentjurisdiction justifies exceptions to section 1738 is more
simple. Such exceptions will seldom, if ever, be warranted.
The justification for giving state adjudications preclusive effect
under section 1738 is most clear when a plaintiff's federal claim would
have been within the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court, but plaintiff
failed to present it when suing there. There is little doubt that if the
nexus between the adjudicated state claim and the omitted federal claim
is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of claim preclusion, a subsequent
federal court should preclude the federal claim. 190
The analysis is more difficult when the party to be precluded did not
choose the state forum. 19 1 InAllen v. McCurry,192 a section 1983193 case,
however, the Supreme Court refused to attach significance to this difference. The Court gave issue-preclusive effect to a prior state criminal
185. See supra note 181.
186. Thus I would attach far less importance to the subsequent exercise of exclusive federal
jurisdiction than did the ALI in its RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. See supra note 81
(federal antitrust claims would not be barred by judgment in state court under state antitrust laws).
187. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
189. "[W]henever a state court judgment is refused an effect with which it would otherwise be
endowed, some stress is imposed on the relations of mutual respect that properly characterize the
federal legal system." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment d (1982). The
Supreme Court has recognized that notions of comity and federalism support federal court recognition of state judgments. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
190. Noting the possibility of sufficiently related state and federal claims, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments states:
When the plaintiff brings an action on the claim in a court, either state or federal, in which
there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents
only one of them, and judgment is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second
action in which he tenders the other theory or ground.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e (1982); see also id. § 86 comment f
("[F]ailure to assert an alternative federal basis for a claim that could rest on both federal and state
law generally results in claim preclusion."). For a general discussion of requirements of claim preclusion, see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
191. Several writers give this factor considerable weight. See Smith, supra note 50,at 112; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism,90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1342 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Developments; Comment, Res Judicataand Section 1983: The Effect ofState-Court Judgments on FederalCivil Rights Actions, 27 UCLA L. REv. 177, 200 (1979).
192. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
193. Congress enacted § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-86 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982)).
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court determination that the rights of the federal court plaintiff had not
been violated.
Despite numerous suggestions to the contrary,1 94 the Supreme
Court was correct in refusing to imply an exception to section 1738 based
upon section 1983.195 Federal courts should be as free under section
1738 to give preclusive effect to issues decided in state criminal proceedings as they would be to give preclusive effect to issues decided in federal
criminal adjudications. 19 6 Section 1983 does not suggest that Congress
intended to assure a federal-court setting for section 1983 litigation 197 or
that Congress intended to guarantee civil rights litigants the opportunity
to litigate all their issues from an affirmative posture. 198 Furthermore,
194. See, ag., Smith, supra note 50, at 63 n.22 (citing extensive list of commentaries).
195. The Court stated in Allen:
[N]othing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to
deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting
within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate
federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights.
449 U.S. at 103-04.
For a while it appeared that an exception might be available, depending on how broadly the
Court was willing to read its "full and fair opportunity" prerequisite. See Resnik, supra note 18, at
972. However, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)-although a Title VII
case-served to confine the avenue of escape in § 1983 proceedings to Constitution-based collateral
attack, holding that "state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith
and credit guaranteed" by § 1738. Id at 481. In Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
465 U.S. 75 (1984), the Court rejected in more categorical terms the argument that § 1983 supports
an exception to § 1738 and extended its issue-preclusion holding in Allen, 449 U.S. 90, to the field of
claim preclusion. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 83.
196. Federal courts have given preclusive effect in civil rights cases to prior federal criminal
proceedings. See Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Smallwood v. United
States, 358 F. Supp. 398, 409 (E.D. Mo. 1973). Preclusion can operate regardless of whether the
precluded party is plaintiff or defendant in a subsequent civil action:
[I]t is beyond question that a prior criminal proceeding can have a collateral estoppel [issue
preclusive] effect in the subsequent civil action. This general rule is not changed by the fact
that the action is brought by the person convicted in the prior criminal action instead of the
usual case where the government brings civil action to recover damages subsequent to the
criminal conviction.
Willard v. United States, 422 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted). The issue-preclusive
effect of criminal convictions in favor of third parties is generally recognized in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85(2)(a) (1982).

The preclusive effect of the state criminal judgment on federal § 1983 proceedings should be
first examined with reference to state law. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. If state
law supports the conclusion that the judgment is preclusive, § 1738 requires that it be given preclusive effect. A decision to preclude could be based on federal doctrine if state law on the point is
confused or undeveloped, see supra note 147 and accompanying text, or if the federal court is warranted in augmenting the preclusive effect of the state judgment, see infra text accompanying notes
234-40, 250.
197. But see Smith, supra note 50, at 61-62 (suggesting that legislative intent behind § 1983 may
support case-by-case exceptions to state rules of preclusion).
198. One critic has argued that federal suits under § 1983 should "be unfettered by prior state
court determinations where the federal plaintiff did not freely elect to litigate in state courts." Theis,
Res Judicatain Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859, 873
(1976). For statements in a similar vein, see Developments, supra note 191, at 1342; Comment, supra
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because federal court jurisdiction in section 1983 cases is only concurrent,1 99 it is impossible to argue-as one might attempt to argue if the
jurisdiction were exclusive 2°°-that suspension of section 1738 must be
20 1
implied in order to realize the purposes of federal jurisdiction.
Although the legislative history of section 1983 includes evidence of concern over civil rights enforcement in state courts, this provides an inadequate basis for implying the suspension of section 1738.202 As Professor
Currie noted, "All grants of federal jurisdiction are based upon some
' 20 3
perceived inadequacy of state courts.
The Court's position in Allen seems defensible for another reason.
In a line of cases beginning with Younger v. Harris,2°4 the Supreme Court
sharply reduced the availability of federal injunctive or declaratory relief
under section 1983 against state law-enforcement officials. The purpose
of the Younger doctrine is to remit federal civil rights claimants to pending state judicial proceedings. 20 5 Whatever misgivings one might have
note 191, at 200. As the Supreme Court declared in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97 (1980),
however, there is no suggestion from § 1983 that such an effect is intended. In Professor Currie's
words, "No language in section 1983 remotely suggests any modification of res judicata." Currie,
supra note 79, at 328.
199. Federal jurisdiction to entertain § 1983 actions exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343
(1982). The United States Supreme Court has yet to determine whether or under what circumstances state courts are obliged to entertain § 1983 actions. See, eg., Spencer v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 1859, 1859 (1985) (per curiam) (affirming by an equally divided vote and without opinion the refusal of South Carolina courts to entertain a § 1983 claim). It is clear, however,
that state courts are competent to adjudicate § 1983 claims and they have usually been willing to do
so. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (affirming state court adjudication of § 1983 claim).
200. Current law suggests that an exception to § 1738 should be implied if preclusion by state
judgment would so frustrate the purposes served by exclusive federal jurisdiction as to make suspension of § 1738 implicit in the jurisdictional grant. See supra note 154 and text following note 153.
201. Cf. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 244 (Supp.
1981) ("When Congress 'assures' a litigant a federal forum for the vindication of certain rights,
should that be taken as a decision to deprive state courts of normal competence finally to adjudicate
federal questions properly before them in cases over which they have jurisdiction?") (emphasis in
original).
202. As the Court observed in Allen v. McCurry:
[T~he debates show that one strong motive behind [§ 1983's] enactment was grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights. But in
the context of the legislative history as a whole, this congressional concern lends only the
most equivocal support to any argument that, in cases where the state courts have recognized the constitutional claims asserted and provided fair procedures for determining them,
Congress intended to override § 1738 or the common-law rules of collateral estoppel and
res judicata. Since repeals by implication are disfavored, much clearer support than this
would be required to hold that § 1738 and the traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits.
449 U.S. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
203. Currie, supra note 79, at 328.
204. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
205. In Younger, the Court struck down a federal injunction against a pending state criminal
prosecution alleged to be in violation of the federal plaintiff's first amendment rights. The decision
was based in part on considerations of equitable discretion--"the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act.., to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
party has [through assertion of his rights as a state criminal defendant] an adequate remedy at law
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over the wisdom or necessity of the Younger doctrine, the deference to
state proceedings that it requires would be illusory if resulting state judgments were denied preclusive effect in federal court. This is why arguments to imply an exception to section 1738 based on section 1983
frequently seem to be an attempt to refight the battle against the Younger
doctrine.20 6 If the Younger doctrine is wrong, it should be addressed on
its own terms. 20 7 Unless or until it is, Allen must be followed.
Recently, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Allen to reach
claim as well as issue preclusion. In Migra v. Warren City School District
Board of Education,2 0 8 plaintiff school administrator sued her employers
in Ohio state court for wrongful discharge. She later brought a section
1983 suit against the same defendants in federal court. Noting that she
had failed to present her section 1983 claim in the prior state adjudication,20 9 the Supreme Court held that she was subject to any claim preclusion existing under Ohio state law. 2 10 In so doing, the Court again
rejected the argument that section 1983 operated as an exception to section 1738.211 The Court noted that plaintiff's argument for an exception
was the same as had been put forth in Allen: "[T]hat state-court judgments should have'less preclusive effect in § 1983 suits than in other federal suits" because of "Congress' expressed concern over the adequacy
and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." 401 U.S. at 43-44. The Court also
noted concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 44. In a series of cases beginning with Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court has used the Younger doctrine to bar § 1983 injunctions
against pending state civil proceedings. And, the Court has invoked Younger to bar the issuance of
federal declaratory judgments in cases in which issuance of injunctions would not be permitted. See
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
206. CompareSmith, supra note 50, at 61-62 (arguing that policy and precedent support flexible
application of full faith and credit principles in § 1983 litigation) and Theis, supra note 198, at 873
(arguing that the history and purpose of § 1983 require an exception to § 1738) with Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 342-47 (1977) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (claiming that to deny the § 1983
plaintiff access to federal courts because of pending state civil proceedings is contrary to the purposes of the § 1983 remedy) and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 616-18 (1975) (Brennan,
Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that in Younger doctrine cases the history and purpose
of § 1983 require initial access to federal courts).
207. It is my view, and that of many other commentators, that the Younger doctrine is wrong.
Perhaps the most basic problem with Younger is that it usurps Congress' prerogative to allocate
judicial business between the state and federal courts. See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 88 (1984); Shreve, FederalInjunctionsand
the PublicInterest, 51 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 382, 413-19 (1983). For a thoughful critique of other
frailties of the Younger doctrine, see Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State CriminalJustice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrinefrom a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C.D. L. REv. 31
(1985).
208. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
209. Id. at 83. On the availability of § 1983 adjudications in state court, see supra note 199.
210. 465 U.S. at 85. Using the technique it was to repeat in Marrese, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a more searching examination of state preclusion law. It appeared, however,
that Migra's claim could be precluded under Ohio law. See Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio
St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).
211. 465 U.S. at 84.
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of state courts as protectors of federal rights."2 1 2 Reiterating the view it
had expressed in Allen concerning the relationship between sections 1983
and 1738, the Court stated: "It is difficult to see how the policy concerns
underlying § 1983 would justify a distinction between the issue preclusive
'21 3
and claim preclusive effects of state-court judgments.
The Court seems to have reached the correct decision in Migra.
Plaintiff Migra weakened her position when she opted to begin by litigating in state court. Her failure to present a sufficiently related federal
claim, also within the state court's jurisdiction, would be lethal under
conventional wisdom. 2 14 Under such circumstances, it would be impossible to deny preclusive effect to the Ohio judgment without questioning
21 5
the underlying authority of Allen.
When the Supreme Court correctly concluded in Allen that an exception to section 1738 could not be implied from section 1983,216 it
greatly undercut its earlier decision in England v. LouisianaState Board
of Medical Examiners.2 17 The Court had held in Englandthat a federalcourt claimant, required by the Pullman abstention doctrine2 1 8 to present
his state-law issues in state court, could thereafter reintroduce his federal
212. Id. at 83-84.
213. Id. at 83; cf.McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1984) (equating
claim and issue preclusion and refusing to give preclusive effect under § 1738 to a state arbitration
award). On the tendency of the Supreme Court not to distinguish between claim and issue preclusion in § 1738 cases, see supra note 115.
214. This is the view taken in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. See supra note
190. The American Law Institute hedged with reference to § 1983 cases, however, describing them
as "[p]articularly difficult and controversial." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment d (1982).
215. But see Note, Claim Preclusion and Section 1983 Civil Rights Actions: Migra v. Warren
City School Board of Education, 70 IowA L. REv. 287, 292 (1984) (attempting to distinguish Migra
from Allen and arguing that Migra was wrongly decided).
216. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
217. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
218. The doctrine takes its name from Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
It applies when, first, the need to invalidate a state statute or regulation as unconstitutional can be
avoided if state law is given a certain meaning and, second, that meaning is not evident enough for a
federal court to feel comfortable in declaring it, but is within the greater interpretive power of a state
court. See Wechsler, FederalJurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 232 (1948) (noting the difficulties "inhering in the fact that federal courts are not
the authorized expositors of state law"); see alsosupra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties facing federal judges in resolving questions of unsettled state law).
Under the Pullman doctrine, a variety of different consequences from state adjudications may
serve to avoid the necessity of federal constitutional adjudication. The state-law issue might be
whether the challenged state statute can be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional problems, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), whether the challenged statute
might not also violate the state constitution, Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), or whether the
case might otherwise be disposed of on state-law grounds. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496.
Rules governing abstention are more difficult to determine when a federal constitutional question is not raised. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1950)
(requiring abstention) with Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (refusing
abstention).
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issues in federal court. 2 19 Although not in so many words,220 England
operated to suspend section 1738 by insulating any subsequent federallaw adjudication in federal court from the claim- or issue-preclusive ef-

fects of the state judgment.
The England decision is simply wrong. It is probably true that the
dispensation England grants from section 1738 is necessary for the Pullman doctrine to work as intended.2 21 But, even if preservation of the

Pullman doctrine is desirable, 222 it cannot be accomplished through illicit suspension of section 1738.223 Absent an exception to section 1738,
the statute clearly requires state judgments to be given as much preclusive effect in federal court as they would have received where rendered.
Because no statutory exception exists for England-type cases, the
Supreme Court is in the indefensible position of creating an exception as
224
a matter of judicial doctrine.
219. He could do so if the adjudication of the state issues did not moot the case and if he informed "the state courts that he [was] exposing his federal claims" there to assist the state courts in
evaluating the state issues and "that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the
question of state law, to return to the district court for disposition of his federal contentions." England, 375 U.S. at 421.
220. Curiously, the Court makes no reference to § 1738 in England.
221. Although the Younger doctrine requires dismissal of the federal case, see supra note 205,
invocation of the Pullman doctrine is more appropriately accompanied by a stay of the proceedings.
The Supreme Court has encouraged federal courts to retain jurisdiction. E.g., Harris County
Comm'r's Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4
(1967). If the purpose for adjudicating the federal case does not disappear during the interim, see
supra note 218, the federal court is expected to conclude the litigation. Pullman abstention "does
not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise ...." Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
It has never been suggested that the reasons supporting the Pullman doctrine are sufficient to
justify forfeiture of plaintiff's opportunity to seek a federal court determination of federal law. Yet
this is the effect Pullman abstention could have without the protections of England. If the state case
came to final judgment first and was permitted full effect, it could prevent by claim or issue preclusion the subsequent federal court adjudication of plaintiff's federal issues. Without England, Pullman abstention could function as an "abdication of federal jurisdiction." Harrison,360 U.S. at 177.
Putting the matter somewhat differently, Professor Currie observed, "To reduce the violence abstention does to section 1331 [general federal question jurisdiction], England ignores section 1738."
Currie, supra note 79, at 331.
222. The Pullman doctrine has received a generally unfavorable critical reception. Commentators have pointed to the egregious delays that federal court claimants have been subjected to under
Pullman. E.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 80, at 283-84. Another problem is the obscurity of the
Pullman criteria. See Field, The UncertainNature of FederalJurisdiction,22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
683, 697-98 (1981) (advocating the abolition of the Pullman doctrine); see also Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute PartII, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (advocating the
abolition of the Pullman doctrine); Note, Judicial Abstention, supra note 162, at 223 n.17 (citing
numerous authorities critical of the Pullman doctrine). It has been suggested that the doctrine may
actually be counterproductive to interests of federalism. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 21, at 102.
223. It should be possible for the Court to overrule England without disturbing the few opportunities that now exist for federal courts to certify state-law questions to state high courts. See supra
note 140. It is doubtful whether state high courts would have the jurisdiction or the inclination to
use certification proceedings to reach and decide federal issues. It is also unlikely that state doctrine
would view such proceedings as precluding matters beyond the scope of the state-law inquiry.
224. It is axiomatic that the Supreme Court cannot amend a congressional enactment. While
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VI.
A.

Section 1738 and Authority to Give Greater Preclusive Effect to
Judgments: A Reconciliation
The Basisfor Limited Federal Court Autonomy

Concurring in Migra, Justice White expressed doubt whether realization of section 1738's purpose required federal courts to give no greater
preclusive effect to state judgments than state courts would give them. 225
Although he noted that important federal preclusion policies might be
served by permitting federal courts to give greater preclusive effect to
state judgments, 226 he concluded: "The contrary construction of § 1738
is nevertheless one of long standing, and Congress has not seen fit to
' 227
disturb it, however justified such an action might have been."
Justice White is correct in questioning the wisdom of a blanket application of section 1738 to divest federal courts of all authority to give
greater preclusive effect to state judgments. He is also correct in suggesting that a well-settled interpretation of section 1738 would be especially difficult for the court to revise. 228 But Justice White was wrong in
one respect: the law was not settled at the time he wrote his concurrence. 229 It is not clear whether the Supreme Court hedged sufficiently
in Marrese to preserve its options; 230 in other words, whether the way
still is open for the Supreme Court to hold that federal courts may give
federal courts enjoy considerable common-law authority to determine the preclusive effect of federal
judgments, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text, they lost comparable authority concerning
state judgments with the passage of the full faith and credit statute in 1790. See supra notes 77-78
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court spoke of the preemptive effect of congressional initiative on the authority of federal courts to make common law in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981):
We have always recognized that federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress."... Federal common law is a "necessary expedient," and when Congress
addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the
need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.
Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has acknowledged the limitations imposed
under this principle by § 1738. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
225. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (White, J.,
concurring).
226. Id.
227. Id. Because of his view of precedent, Justice White felt that the Supreme Court would have
been warranted in concluding that "preclusion in this case must be determined under state law, even
if there would be preclusion under federal standards." Id.
228. See id. On the particular weight of stare decisis given to the Court's settled interpretations
of statutes, see supra note 180.
229. Justice White supported his conclusion that § 1738 has divested federal courts of the power
to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments with four Supreme Court cases, the most recent of
which was Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940). Migra, 465
U.S. at 88. He did not mention the Court's more recent neglect of state preclusion law in determining the effect of state judgments. See supra note 107. Nor did he note the Supreme Court's apparent
acknowledgment of federal court authority to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments in
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983). See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 98.
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greater preclusive effect to a state judgment without having to overrule
any of its recent decisions.2 31 A post-Marrese decision suggests 232 time
for the development of a rationale permitting more discriminating application of section 1738 is running out. If the Supreme Court has not
reached the conclusion already, it seems to be moving toward the view
23 3
that section 1738 categorically forbids greater preclusion.
This constrictive view of section 1738 proceeds from the erroneous
assumption that if the statute does not require preclusion it invariably
forbids it. Granted, if state law does not make the state judgment preclusive, a federal court cannot use section 1738 as authority to make it
preclusive. But, although section 1738 protects important state interests
by requiring federal courts to give as much preclusive effect to the state
judgment as would state courts, 23 4 it is less clear how or when important
state interests also would be sacrificed should the federal court decide to
give greater preclusive effect to the judgment. 235 Section 1738 functions
well as a rule of efficiency to ban without further inquiry all attempts to
give less preclusive effect to state judgments, 236 but it should not be applied as uncritically in greater preclusion cases.
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for a more flexible ap231. The refusal of the Supreme Court to give greater preclusive effect to the Illinois judgment,
see supra note 91 and accompanying text, can be reconciled with an interpretation of § 1738 that
would permit greater preclusive effect in different and more deserving cases. See infra notes 277-81
and accompanying text.
232. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768 (1986). This case is discussed
supra note 100.
233. See supra text accompanying note 91 and note 100.
234. See supra notes 103, 104, 189 and accompanying text.
235. Commentators have questioned whether the federal requirement of full faith and credit
should be understood to extend to the whole body of a state's preclusion law. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at
522-23; cf Atwood, supra note 50, at 70 n.54 (stating that, although the language of § 1738 reaches
both situations, "Congress ... was clearly concerned with the problem of non-recognition of sisterstate judgments rather than the possibility of 'over-recognition' "). Others have maintained that
forums should be entitled to apply their local rules of nonmutual issue preclusion to enforce judgments originating from states that adhere to the preclusion limitations of the mutuality doctrine.
E.g., A. VESTAL, supra note 7, at 54-55; Carrington, CollateralEstoppel and ForeignJudgments, 24
OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 383 (1963); Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by PriorLitigation, 74 Nw. U.L. REv.
742, 753 (1979). But see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 695 (taking the
position that the law of the place rendering the judgment should be used to settle all preclusion
questions); Degnan, supra note 3, at 773 (same); Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral
Estoppel, and Conflicts ofLaws, 44 TENN. L. REV. 927, 948 (1977) (same). The Restatement (Second) frames the greater preclusion issue, but the discussion is inconclusive. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment g (1982).
236. "The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 require that a state judgment be given no lesser effect
than it has under the law of the state whose court rendered the judgment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment g (1982). In addition, see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying
text. Of course, this is true in federal court only if another act of Congress does not function as a
statutory exception to § 1738. See supra Part V.
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proach in Haring v. Prosise.237 The Court in Haring seemed to distinguish between the function of section 1738 in authorizing or explaining
the choice of state preclusion law and the possible function of the statute
in limiting choices. The Court suggested that federal judges must follow
section 1738 for state judgments that would be preclusive where rendered, 238 that section 1738 can only explain the application of state preclusion law,23 9 but that-at least in cases in which state courts would not
regard the judgment as preclusive-section 1738 may not confine the
24
choice to state preclusion law. 0
The Haring Court considered whether a state criminal proceeding,
concluded by respondent's guilty plea, had an issue-preclusive effect on
respondent's subsequent federal civil rights action against local police authorities. The Court concluded that Virginia preclusion law would not
give effect to the state judgment.24 1 Under a restrictive reading of section
1738, the Court would have stopped there. Instead, the Court went on to
consider whether the state judgment should preclude respondent as a
matter of federal law. 242
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not find section 1738 to be as
dominating in Haring'sgreater preclusion setting.243 Section 1738 would
have settled the matter only if state law rendered the judgment issuepreclusive. The failure of Virginia courts to regard the Virginia judgment as preclusive simply meant that petitioners would have to search
beyond section 1738 for justification for their preclusion argument. 244
The problem with Haring is that it is as undiscriminating in its support of federal-court autonomy as other recent decisions have been in
237. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
238. See id. at 314-16.
239. See id. at 314 & n.8.
240. See id at 316-20. This entire discussion would have been unnecessary if the Court had held
that § 1738 was a per se rule against greater preclusion.
241. Id at 316-17.
242. See id. at 316-20. With extended discussion, the Court found respondent's case for a federal
rule of preclusion without merit. Id. For an illuminating view of the problem in Haringand of the
general difficulties of granting issue-preclusive effects to guilty pleas, see Shapiro, Should a Guilty
Plea Have PreclusiveEffect?, 70 IowA L. RF-v. 27 (1984).
243. Quoting Union & Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903), the Court said: "If
the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior judgment, the courts of the United
States can accord it no greater efficacy under § 1738." 462 U.S. at 313 n.6. It is interesting to note
that Justice White quotes the same passage from the Union & Planters'Bank case to support his
conclusion that "preclusion must be determined under state law, even if there would be preclusion
under federal standards." Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984)
(White, J., concurring).
244. The Court stated: "We therefore conclude that Virginia law would not bar Prosise from
litigating the validity of the search .... Accordingly, the issue is not foreclosed under... § 1738."
462 U.S. at 317.
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doubting the same. 245 There are two reasons for reading section 1738 to
restrict the authority of federal judges to augment the preclusive effects
of state judgments. First, the preclusion goals of repose and judicial efficiency may be most easily advanced when the law of the rendering state
can be depended upon to determine the preclusive scope of the judgment. 246 Second, courts should respect attempts made by state judgments to advance local substantive policies. Although it may be easier to
read a state's propreclusion position as an attempt to advance local substantive policies, 247 the judgment-rendering court may also use a restrained theory of preclusion to advance substantive policies. 248
Admittedly, the second reason for honoring the preclusion limitations of the rendering state is more elusive than the first. In many cases,
the first reason seems adequate to support judicial application of the rendering state's rule of lesser preclusion, making unnecessary an examination of the policies underlying state law. The choice of the preclusion
law of the rendering state, however, does not completely secure the advantage of certainty. 249 By themselves, the state's interests in repose and
judicial efficiency should not provide sufficient justification for forcing
federal courts to abandon objectives of federal procedural policy that
would be realized by giving greater preclusive effect to the state judgment.2 50 Therefore, federal law and policy should not yield unless choos245. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
246. Uncertainty is counterproductive to the purposes of preclusion. "Uncertainty intrinsically
works to defeat the opportunities for repose and reliance sought by the rules of preclusion, and
confounds the desire for efficiency by inviting repetitious litigation to test the preclusive effects of the
first effort." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4407, at 49; cf Burbank,
supra note 3, at 627 (noting that "simplicity and predictability... are important where legal rules
shape litigation conduct, as do preclusion rules").
247. Subject to occasional choice-of-law considerations, the original adjudication provides the
state forum with an instrument for applying local substantive rules to shape and limit the legal
consequences of the controversy. State propreclusion law can be seen as a means of protecting the
judicial product. Cf. Averill, supra note 65, at 691 (advocating an assessment of the substantive
dimensions of judgments presented elsewhere for enforcement).
248. See infra note 271 (offering examples).
249. Professor Carrington has written that the benefits of certainty likely to flow from a rule
requiring application of the rendering state's preclusion law are limited. "This single additional
anchor of certainty adds little to what the attentive plaintiff may anticipate without it and surely
there is no special need for uniformity, no special hazard of forum-shopping, which can be attributed
to the law ofjudgments." Carrington, supra note 235, at 385. He also noted the uncertainty associated with attempts to determine the content of foreign preclusion law. "The application of foreign
law, like the application of the Erie doctrine, requires the court to try to think with the minds of
others-a process so difficult that it seems often to frustrate all thought." Id (footnotes omitted).
The degree of inevitable uncertainty may not be quite this great. But Professor Carrington does
demonstrate the imperfections of reliance on the preclusion law of the rendering state as a means of
promoting clarity. For a discussion of the process of determining foreign preclusion law, its attendant difficulties, and Erie doctrine analogues, see supra subpart IV(B).
250. Here I disagree with Professor Degnan. He concluded his superb article with the following
proposed rule:
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ing the rendering state's rule of lesser preclusion is necessary to secure
2 51
the state's substantive interests.
The choice-of-preclusion-law approach suggested in this Article
brings a form of interest analysis 2 52 to the problem. Interest of the fedA valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United States must be
recognized by all other judicial systems within the United States, and the claims and issues
precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound thereby, are determined by the law of
the system which rendered the judgment.
Degnan, supra note 3, at 773. In many, if not most, cases, I would come out the same way. But
Professor Degnan's invariable choice of the preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state does not
always produce desirable results. See infra subpart VI(B). It is for the best that "[c]ourts have not
yet accepted any such clear rule." 18 C. WRIoHT,A. MILLER & E,COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at
618.
251. The approach taken by some federal diversity courts suggests that they would interpose
state preclusion law even in such cases in which it is not necessary to secure the state's substantive
interests. See, ag., Mackris v. Murry, 397 F.2d 74, 81 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Michigan state law
of collateral estoppel, and requiring mutuality); McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F.
Supp. 335, 338-39 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (holding that Mississippi law controlled the application of collateral estoppel, and deciding that estoppel could not be applied under either state or federal law).
They would do so, not upon the conclusion that § 1738 requires federal courts to give the same
preclusive effect to all state judgments, but because of a misguided conception that the Erie doctrine
applies. The interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), required by the
Erie doctrine is explained and compared to the approach under § 1738 in supra notes 132-47 and
accompanying text. There is no question that the propreclusion position taken by federal courts is
bottomed on concerns of judicial administration that are procedural in character. See infra notes
253, 263-65 and accompanying text. And the Erie doctrine has never been used by the Supreme
Court to displace federal law when to do so would sacrifice clear federal procedural interests. When
such interests have been at stake, federal law has prevailed over contrary state law. See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). It is
in keeping with the modern and, I think, correct view to suggest that the Erie doctrine is a red
herring in the judgment-enforcement context and that § 1738 provides a proper and sufficient standard for such cases. See Degnan, supra note 3, at 750, 769-70 (commenting that when state judgments are presented in federal court, "Erie has no voice on the issue").
Erie works some mischief if applied to state-judgment cases. Granted, in many cases in which
federal courts are asked to give greater effect to state judgments, § 1738 too should require the
application of state preclusion law. See supra text following note 248. The application of Erie would
do no great harm in such cases because it merely substitutes § 1652 for § 1738 as the basis for the
result. However, because federal courts should be free to follow their own law of nonmutual issue
preclusion in the proper circumstances, see infra subpart VI(B), cases that follow Erie to choose a
state rule of mutuality are wrong in both approach and result. See Mackris, 397 F.2d at 81 (continuing state court's requirement of mutuality for the offensive use of collateral estoppel); McCarty, 502
F. Supp. at 338-39 (following state's prohibition of collateral estoppel when mutuality is lacking).
252. Interest analysis is a cornerstone of contemporary choice-of-law analysis. It is used to resolve apparent conflicts between the rules of two or more different jurisdictions. Interest analysis is
the technique of determining the true extent of conflict by examining the policies behind the rules
vying for acceptance. Professor Brainerd Currie deserves considerable credit for developing the approach through his writings. E.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171. See
generally Shreve, Currie's Government Interest Analysis--Has It Become a Paper Tiger?, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 541 (1985) (discussing the contributions of Professor Currie at greater length). Other influential works include Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933),
and Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1959). Interest
analysis has figured prominently in the work of the most influential modern commentators. See R.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra
note 32, at 77; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7-8 (3d ed. 1986).

With one exception, Lewis, Mutuality in Conflict-Flexibility and Full Faith and Credit, 23
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eral enforcement forum in having a rule of greater preclusion applied
exists to the extent that federal procedural policies are implicated. Interest of the state court in having its rule of lesser preclusion applied exists
to the extent that its substantive policies are implicated. When a state's
position derives from a procedural concern, for example, that its courts
not treat litigants unfairly, that policy does not support the state's rule of
lesser preclusion when its judgment is offered for enforcement elsewhere. 25 3 When the state rule of lesser preclusion is intended to facilitate
a substantive policy-to help make real that state's vision of the behavioral expectations and demands of its substantive law254-the picture
changes. The established reading of section 1738 to guarantee as much
preclusive effect to a state judgment in federal court proceeds, at least in
part, from the need to give intersystem effect to a state court's attempt to
bind the parties in the case to its conception of rights and duties. 255 The
rendering state's attempt to address the same matters by refusing to bind
the parties is a difference only in technique. It should be treated with no
less respect.
Federal courts should not be permitted simply to characterize the
question as procedural and apply their own preclusion law. 25 6 Genuine
DRAKE L. REv. 364 (1974), interest analysis does not seem to have played much of a role in choice
of preclusion law. In his interesting article, Professor Lewis takes the somewhat radical position that
state courts should be free to augment the preclusive effects of sister-state judgments simply upon a
showing that the enforcement state has an interest in having its rule of greater preclusion applied.
See id. at 385.
Some may object to using interest analysis in choice of preclusion law, because they think of
preclusion law as securing party prerogatives rather than advancing the interests of systems in having their preclusion law applied. Party interests and governmental interests supporting preclusion
greatly overlap. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 12-15.
Preclusion arguments protect litigants and provide a mechanism for advancing the system's policy
ends. But the benefits of preclusion should be available even in the absence of party initiatives. Cf.
Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court is authorized to raise
res judicata issue sua sponte).
253. See infra text accompanying notes 263-64. Federal courts considering such judgments are
presented with what interest analysis would consider a "false" conflict. False conflicts occur either
when the rules produce the same result or (as here) the outcome of the case is capable of frustrating
policy supporting only one of two ostensibly conflicting rules. E. SCOLEs & P. HAY, CONFLIcT OF
LAws 17 (1982). The reach of state proceduralpolicies does not extend to the federal case. Therefore no legitimate state policies will be sacrificed if the federal court applies its rule of nonmutual
preclusion instead of the mutuality rule of the judgment-rendering state.
254. The substance-versus-procedure distinction can be misused, a fact made clear by Justice
Frankfurter in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But the distinction does seem useful
as a means of expressing the difference between "the body of rules which define legal rights, that is,
... the claims which people make on one another and recognize as valid," and rules "structuring and
regulating the judicial process." Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision
Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678, 696 (1976) (footnotes omitted). As Justice Frankfurter
seemed to suggest, the distinction is serviceable so long as an effort is made to remember that "[e]ach
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used." 326 U.S. at
108.
255. See supra notes 103-04, 188-89 and accompanying text.
256. Under the traditional choice-of-law approach, courts have frequently used the procedural
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procedural concerns often justify favoring local law in a traditional
choice-of-law setting.257 But section 1738 must be read to confine federal
court access to their own preclusion rules, even when the policies supporting those rules are implicated. Only when the judgment-rendering
state is uninterested in the choice-of-law outcome should the way be free
for federal courts to give expression to federal propreclusion policies.
This analysis provides a framework for the development of a more
discriminating theory of interpretation for section 1738 in greater preclusion cases. Under section 1738, federal courts should respect the preclusive limitations of many state judgments, including, as shall be seen, the
Illinois judgment in Marrese.258 In other cases, the statute should be
read to permit federal courts freedom to give more preclusive effect to
state judgments. Perhaps the most evident category of cases for which
freedom of greater preclusion should exist is that involving nonmutual
issue preclusion.
B. Authority to DisregardState Mutuality Limitations-A Suggested
Enclave of Federal Court Autonomy
Federal courts have dispensed with the mutuality requirement when
determining the issue-preclusive effects of federal judgments. 259 Most
states have also dispensed with the requirement; 260 however a minority
have not.261 Should a federal court honor the preclusive limitations of
the mutuality doctrine when presented with state judgments from mutuality jurisdictions?
The mutuality doctrine was purged from intramural federal preclusion law in order to conserve federal judicial resources that would otherwise be expended in relitigation of issues. 262 It is difficult to see how the
characterization as an a priori justification for selection of their own law. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
supra note 253, at 58-59; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 252, at 53.
257. In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Supreme Court used the due process
clause to strike down the Texas courts' attempts to favor local law through implausible characterization of an issue as procedural. So long, however, as forum law does address what can reasonably be
described as procedural concerns, it need not give way to conflicting law.
Enormous burdens are avoided when a court applies its own rules, rather than the rules of
another state, to issues relating to judicial administration, such as the proper form of action, service of process, pleading, rules of discovery, mode of trial and execution and costs.
•.. Even if the outcome would be altered,... the forum will usually apply its own rule if
the issue primarily concerns judicial administration.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 comment a (1971).

258. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
259. For an explanation of the mutuality doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 15. The
Supreme Court's rejection of the doctrine is discussed supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
262. Concern for the conservation of judicial resources is particularly strong within the federal
court system. See supra notes 21, 24-27 and accompanying text.
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interest of federal courts in advancing these federal procedural concerns
diminshes when they encounter state judgments.26 3 If the mfituality doctrine was an instrument for advancing substantive policies, federal courts
should be bound under section 1738 to honor the mutuality doctrine.
Because this is not so, however, federal courts should be free to give effect to the judgments of mutuality states according to the federal law of

nonmutual issue preclusion.
A state's election to restrain the enforcement of its own judgments
through the mutuality doctrine has nothing to do with the process of
defining and limiting substantive rights. The interests that the mutuality
doctrine advances are procedural, not substantive, in character. The
doctrine prohibits use of an adjudication to bind one who could not have
profited from the judgment had the case turned out differently. It represents a value judgment bottomed on concerns of procedural fairness-the
adjudications of a system should not be available for use on a one-way
basis.264 States have a right to supplement federal due process in promoting particular ideas of procedural fairness. They have a right to employ the mutuality doctrine to shield litigants from what they perceive to
be unfair use of their own courts. But this concern is not implicated
when their judgments are presented for enforcement in a federal court.
The legitimate interest of state mutuality jurisdictions in protecting litigants does not extend to protecting federal litigants from the intended
effects of federal issue preclusion doctrine.
Federal courts should draw upon two sources in determining the
fair limits of issue preclusion to be given to state judgments: the Constitution and federal preclusion law and policy. Developments in the latter
area led to rejection of the mutuality doctrine. This was accomplished
through a new conception of procedural fairness, one in which fairness to
the courts and the public was also taken into account. Strangers could
bind those who had previously obtained an adjudication of the issue
whenever it would not be unfair to do so.265
Two due process questions should be noted at the constitutional
263. As Chief Justice Burger observed in Marrese, "federal courts have direct interests in ensuring that their resources are used efficiently and not as a means of harassing defendants with repetitive lawsuits, as well as in ensuring that parties asserting federal rights have an adequate opportunity
to litigate those rights." Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring); cf Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Edue., 465 U.S. 75,
88 (1984) (White, J., concurring) ("If the federal courts have developed rules of res judicata and
collateral estoppel that prevent relitigation in circumstances that would not be preclusive in state
courts, the federal courts should be free to apply them, the parties then being free to relitigate in the
state courts.").
264. For further discussion, see supra note 20.
265. The focus of the succeeding test shifted from the person wishing to use the doctrine to the
one against whom it was invoked. Id.
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level. The first and easiest is whether nonmutual issue preclusion is itself
constitutional. The Supreme Court has made clear that it is.266 The second question initially seems more troublesome. Is a party to a prior adjudication denied due process if she is precluded under circumstances
that would not have led to preclusion under the law of the state rendering the judgment?267 The due process concern is over the possibility of
unfair surprise. 268 To prove unfair surprise, the litigant would have to
argue two points. First, that a reading of the mutuality law of the forum
at the time the case was tried did not give her notice of the possibility
that the judgment could generate the greater preclusive effects of
nonmutuality. Second, that the litigant reasonably relied on the mutuality doctrine to measure her stake in the outcome of the suit and therefore
failed to devote resources to the trial or appeal of the case commensurate
269
with the higher stakes possible under nonmutuality.
On closer examination, a due process objection to application of the
federal rule of nonmutual issue preclusion in such cases would be of
doubtful weight. Because many jurisdictions have overruled their
promutuality precedents, 270 it may be unreasonable for any attorney litigating in a mutuality jurisdiction to rely on the fact that the law will not
be changed when or before the judgment is presented for enforcement
there. Moreover, a litigant who investigated the matter would discover
that the law concerning the obligation of other courts2 71 to enforce the
state mutuality limitations is unclear. This hardly presents a suitable climate for the argument of unfair surprise.
C. The Appropriate Use of Section 1738 to Honor State Law in
GreaterPreclusion Cases: Marrese and Other Examples
Federal courts have developed a broad definition of a claim in their
intramural law of claim preclusion. 2 72 The majority of states have done
266. See authorities cited supra note 17.
267. See Atwood, supra note 50, at 70 n.54 (suggesting that giving greater preclusive effect to a
judgment could lead to due process complications); Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note
6, at 517 (same).
268. Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 526-27.
269. It is easy to base a refusal to employ nonmutual issue preclusion on the failure to satisfy the
prerequisites of the doctrine itself rather than on constitutional grounds. For examples of sensitivity
of the doctrine to possibilities of unfair surprise, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979) (discussed supra note 20), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
270. See supra note 29.
271. The Supreme Court has yet to restrict state courts from giving lesser preclusive effect to
judgments. See, eg., Finley v. Kesling, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-8, 433 N.E.2d 1112, 1116-18 (1982)
(refusing to honor the mutuality limitation that Indiana preclusion law imposed on an Indiana judgment); Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 41, 45, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967) (refusing to honor Texas' mutuality limitation).
272. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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the same. 273 This permits use of claim preclusion to discourage claim
splitting and resulting piecemeal litigation. A minority of states, however, adhere to a narrower claim definition, which permits claim splitting.27 4 Section 1738 should not leave federal courts free to use the
broader claim definition of federal law to give claim-preclusive effect to
judgments from states permitting claim splitting. As in the area of mutuality, strong federal procedural interests are at stake, but, unlike the doctrine of mutuality, policies that underlie state law permitting claim
splitting appear substantive in character.
The policies supporting the federal rule against claim splitting seem
to be as fully implicated when federal courts are presented with state
judgments as when they are presented with judgments of their own. The
policies are procedural 275 and twofold. The first concerns judicial administration. Broad claim definition averts the wasteful expenditure of
federal judicial resources on repetitive litigation by coercing, through
threat of claim forfeiture, the consolidation of claims in the original proceeding. In this sense, a rule against claim splitting is akin to the forum's
procedural law concerning compulsory counterclaims. 276 The second
procedural policy derives from the court's concern that parties before it
be treated fairly. Claim splitting is unfair to the party opposing the claim
in the succeeding case, because it is likely to prolong conflict and increase
the expense of litigation.
Although the policies behind some states' tolerance of claim splitting are more difficult to ascertain, they have been treated as substantive, 2 7 7 and that characterization seems warranted. Perhaps the easiest
way to understand the substantive nature of a rule permitting claim splitting is to reason, a step at a time, from the basic premise underlying why
courts hear cases at all. Courts entertain claims because they are duty
bound to make real the behavioral demands and expectations of substantive law. Most, probably all, jurisdictions have means of demonstrating
that the duty to adjudicate controls even in the face of repetitious litigation, so long as there are extenuating circumstances. 278 Claim-splitting
273. See supra note 29.
274. This is most notable in accident cases. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
275. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 29, at 658; von Mehren & Trautman,
Recognition ofForeignAdjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1601,
1604 (1968).
276. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 29, at 658. For an illuminating comparison of counterclaim and preclusion rules, see Scoles, supra note 235, at 753-54.
277. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 829-30 (1952) (suggesting how interests underlying the law of commercial transactions and of domestic relations might
be advanced when courts permit successive lawsuits).
278. Relief in such cases may be built into claim-preclusion doctrine, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 comment j (1982) (misrepresentation through fraud or innocent misrep-
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states simply take concern for the vindication of substantive principles
one step further by permitting successive suits in the absence of extenuating circumstances. Therefore, in this context, section 1738 should be
read to prohibit a federal court from using a state judgment to preclude a
claim that would not be precluded under the law of the judgment-render279
ing state.
For the moment, let us assume that Illinois law permits the kind of
claim splitting necessary for the plaintiffs to bring successive suits in
courts of limited and general jurisdiction. 280 In that case, the Marrese
Court was correct to reject the possibility that section 1738 could permit
the lower federal courts to give claim-preclusive effect to the judgments. 28 1 Giving greater claim-preclusive effect to the Illinois judgments
could undercut Illinois' substantive policy favoring use of a second suit.
The complication of exclusive federal jurisdiction in Marrese poses
an added threat to Illinois' substantive interests. If federal courts gave
claim-preclusive effect to Illinois judgments like the one in Marrese, Illinois state courts would have fewer opportunities to interpret their state
antitrust statutes. This would happen if plaintiffs initially file in federal
court in order to preserve their federal antitrust claims and also plead
28 2
their state antitrust claims upon a theory of pendent jurisdiction.

resentation of the defendant), or it may have an extrinsic source, eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)
(relief from the judgment on grounds of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect"). A
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) must be made within a year of the entry of
judgment, but, by itself, the motion does not affect the preclusive authority of the judgment. Federal
courts take a similar view regarding the effect of appeals. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 5, § 4427, at 270-71 ("Should the judgment be vacated by the trial court or
reversed on appeal, however, res judicata falls with the judgment.").
279. A federal court would do violence to state substantive interests by using its own rule of
preclusion to adjudicate adversely the merits of plaintiff's claim. If the successive claim was within
the jurisdiction of the state court that rendered the original judgment, the frustrated plaintiff might
try bringing a third suit there. But the defendant could plead the judgment from the intervening
federal case to deny plaintiff access to the claim-splitting advantages of state forum law.
Commentators have suggested that, instead of reaching the merits of these claims, propreclusion forums can promote their policies of efficiency and resource conservation in a manner less
disruptive to the interests of claim-splitting states by dismissing the claims without prejudice. 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 645-48; Carrington, supra note 235, at
386-87. The suggestion merits careful consideration. It furthers procedural policies against free
expenditure of federal court resources, see supra text following note 276, and is preferable to allowing a federal court to give preclusive effect to the first judgment from a claim-splitting state.
However, the troublesome question remains whether, in light of § 1738, federal courts have authority to decline to give life to the substantive policies that may accompany a state judgment by dismissing suits without prejudice. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
280. The question is discussed supra note 128. The Supreme Court directed an examination of
Illinois preclusion law on remand. See supra text accompanying note 76.
281. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
282. So long as "a common nucleus of operative fact" can be demonstrated between the jurisdictionally self-sufficient federal antitrust claim and the state antitrust claim, a federal court may adjudicate the state claim upon a theory of pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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Plaintiffs probably would seek pendent jurisdiction over their state antitrust claims to avert possible loss of the latter from the claim-preclusive
effect of a federal judgment. 283 Granted, in the absence of diversity, another federal court would not have the opportunity to measure the
preclusive effect of the federal judgment because the pendent state claim
would not provide a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This is
a reverse image of the paradox encountered in Marrese.2 84 And, just as
the lack of an opportunity for state courts to pass on precisely the same
preclusion issue does not itself demonstrate in Marrese that state preclusion law is inapplicable, 285 a similar inability of federal courts to make
the particular preclusion determination should not rule out the possibil28 6
ity that federal preclusion law controls.
The attorneys general of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin argued as
amici that claim preclusion in Marrese would have an eviscerating effect
on the development of state antitrust law. 287 The purposes of exclusive
federal jurisdiction are to promote the coherent and uniform development of federal law. 288 States presumably have the same interest in the
authoritative development of their law. Although it is questionable
whether state legislatures can endow their courts with exclusive jurisdiction,28 9 state courts at least seem entitled to the full opportunity to elaborate and refine the meaning of state law through the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction over state antitrust claims.
283. There is considerable support for the argument of preclusion in this context. See 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4412, at 97 n.14; Note, The Res JudicataImpli-

cations ofPendentJurisdiction, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 609 (1981); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e, illustration 10 (1982) (stating that "unless it is clear that the federal
court would have declined as a matter of discretion to exercise [pendent] jurisdiction... the state
action is barred"). The Restatement (Second) position was endorsed by concurring Justices Blackmun and Marshall and by dissenting Justice Brennan in Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., concurring), 411 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284. See supra text preceding note 120.
285. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
286. This view is supported by the fact that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun appear to
have taken their propreclusion position in Moitie as a matter of intramural federal law. See supra
note 283; cf 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4412, at 97 n.14 (suggesting it
is appropriate for a federal court to enjoin as precluded a state adjudication of a claim that should
have been presented under a theory of pendent jurisdiction in a prior federal adjudication).
287. In their amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court, they argued that such a result might "strip
the states of their right to formulate their own state antitrust policies because plaintiffs will be filing
directly in federal court to insure full relief." Brief of the States of the Seventh Circuit, Illinois,
Indiana, and Wisconsin, on Behalf of the Petitioners, at 12; Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). They argued that this would lead to "federal judges,
rather than state courts, molding the Illinois Antitrust laws." Id.
288. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
289. Cf Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting a state's attempt "directly to determine the extraterritorial effect" of its worker's compensation awards); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (refusing to permit a state court
to protect its jurisdiction by enjoining a suit filed in federal court).
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Of course, it is possible to overstate the adverse effect claim preclusion in Marrese might have on the development of state antitrust law;
federal courts have considerable discretion to refuse to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over state claims. 290 A plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to
invoke pendent jurisdiction should insulate her from the preclusive effects of the resulting federal judgment,2 91 leaving the way clear for a subsequent state court adjudication of the state antitrust claim.
Furthermore, there is some indication that state forums would continue
to attract state antitrust litigation, even if plaintiffs forfeited their federal
claims by filing there.292 Still, the prospect of an impairment of Illinois'
interest in developing its substantive law seems real enough to give added
weight to the conclusion that section 1738 should not leave the federal
court free in Marrese to apply a federal rule of greater preclusion.
VII.

Conclusion

This Article began by noting two realms of preclusion law in federal
court: (1) the intramural realm, in which federal courts have considerable autonomy to fashion doctrine governing the preclusive effects of federal judgments; and (2) the intersystem realm, in which section 1738
imposes an obligation on federal courts to honor state judgments comparable to the obligation imposed on the courts of sister states by the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
Issues of federal intramural preclusion law may be taxing, but they
usually are free of the complications of choice of law. Federal cases involving state judgments could be equally free of choice-of-law complications if federal courts always settled preclusion questions by referring to
the state preclusion law of the court rendering the judgment. Section
290. The power to take pendent jurisdiction over a state claim "need not be exercised in every
case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966); see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 105-07 (discussing criteria influencing the Court's
decision in Gibbs).
291. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4412.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61. Professor Hovenkamp wrote:
[T]he notion that federal antitrust law is aggressive while state law is passive is largely a
thing of the past. Since the early 1970's the United States Supreme Court has gradually
restricted the scope of federal antitrust liability and narrowed the range of private persons
who may sue for antitrust violations. On the other hand, many states have broadened the
scope of their antitrust laws and have granted standing to a broader class of plaintiffs than
have a cause of action under the federal laws. As a result, activities that are not illegal
under federal law are condemned by the antitrust law of some states. Furthermore, some
persons who have suffered injury because of antitrust violations have a damages action
under various state antitrust laws while they have no such action under the federal statutes.
Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
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1738 will require this in most cases; however two exceptions currently
exist and two more should be adopted.
Federal courts are not required by section 1738 to accept the conclusion of state law that a judgment of that state is preclusive when:
(1) state preclusion law would produce an unconstitutional result, or
(2) another congressional enactment creates an exception to section 1738.
Although the law currently is unsettled, the Supreme Court should make
clear that federal courts are not confined to state preclusion law in two
additional situations: (1) when state preclusion law is so undeveloped or
confused that it does not suggest an answer to the preclusion problem
that the state judgment poses, or (2) when the federal court can advance
the objectives of its intramural rule of greater preclusion without interfering with any policies that underlie the state's rule of lesser preclusion.
It is difficult to formulate general principles to aid in determining
when exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction should function as an implied exception to section 1738. But, the Supreme Court should provide
more guidance than it has when it suggested that the creation of exclusive federal jurisdiction cannot, in and of itself, be read to imply an exception to section 1738. An implied exception should be found only if
preclusion by state law would so frustrate the purposes served by the
particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction as to make suspension of section
1738 essential to the grant. From the vantage provided in Marrese, it
does not appear that the difference in the effective operation of exclusive
federal antitrust jurisdiction, with or without the suspension of section
1738, usually would be great enough to justify an implied exception.
The interests served in giving state judgments their intended effect
are equally strong when federal concurrent jurisdiction is at stake. Because it is impossible to argue-as one can attempt to do concerning exclusive federal jurisdiction-that suspension of section 1738 is essential
to a grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the implied-exception argument is
far less likely to be convincing. Therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in its much-criticized refusals to imply an exception to section 1738
based on Title 42, section 1983.
Absent a statutory exception, the Court has consistently and correctly read section 1738 to require federal courts to give state judgments
at least the preclusive effect they have under state law. In light of this
rule, the Court's requirement that inquiries begin with an examination of
state law makes sense. But the Court needs to provide far more guidance
for situations in which no state law appears to be on point. The Supreme
Court has greater freedom under section 1738 than it does under section
1652 to develop a flexible and pragmatic approach for coping with un-
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clear state law. Section 1738 should be read to require federal courts to
give preclusive effect to state judgments, not only when preclusion is supported by apposite state precedents, but even when a reading of state
preclusion law only suggests preclusion. When state law provides no answer, however, federal courts should be permitted to revert to federal
preclusion law and policy.
Recent Supreme Court decisions reveal a disturbing drift toward the
conclusion that section 1738 categorically prohibits federal courts from
giving preclusive effects to state judgments when the courts rendering
them would not do so. At the same time, the Court has yet to discuss the
greater preclusion problem thoughtfully or at any length. The subject
needs more extensive examination than the Court has given it so far. To
use the state law of the rendering forum to establish the preclusive effect
of a judgment gives the judgment an element of certainty, which complements the underlying policies of preclusion. But, alone, the advantages
of certainty are not great enough to justify the selection of a state rule of
lesser preclusion when federal interests secured by a rule of greater preclusion would be sacrificed.
Section 1738 should be read to leave federal courts free to augment
the preclusive effects of a state judgment whenever doing so would not
frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of lesser preclusion and
would advance the purpose behind the federal rule of greater preclusion.
This approach brings to the choice-of-preclusion-law question a form of
interest analysis more commonly associated with traditional choice of
law. The approach does not support greater preclusion in Marrese, but
does suggest that federal courts may, at least, apply their own law of
nonmutual issue preclusion to overcome the mutuality limitations of
state law.
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